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APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
and,
THE ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal
representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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W. Marcus W. Nyc (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-6101
Fax: (208)232-61 09
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation, )

Case No. CV-09-2767

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

vs.

)
)
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , )
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
)
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its )
qualified personal representative, Kenneth )
Rammel!.
)
)
Defendants.
)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
ss
)

DAVID E. ALEXANDER, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon his own
personal knowledge, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for the Defendants herein and participated in the entire trial

of this matter.
2.

That during Plaintiffs counsel's closing arguments, he made improper arguments

which invited the jury to decide the case contrary to the law, evidence and the pleading.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 1

415

3.

In particular, during his closing argument, Plaintiff focused on matters previously

rejected by this Court. Namely, that Mr. Rammell only contributed $500 to become a 50% member
of CBI, that the jury should find fraud regarding the will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed
contract with the Rutter Group.
4.

Opposing counsel also made arguments to the jury not based on evidence presented

at trial, in that the Defendants defrauded ABI because if April died ABI would be worth nothing.
5.

Opposing counsel further inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters.

6.

All of which tainted every claim before the jury and urged them to find fraud without

any basis in the pleadings, evidence or in the law and, instead, based on passion and prejudice.
7.

The Court erred in submitting jury instructions and a verdict form which,
a.

permitted the jury to find liability in gross against all of the Defendants for
discrete acts of fraud allegedly committed by individual Defendants;

b.

permitted the jury to assign damages in gross on discrete fraud claims for
each of which the Plaintiff was required by law to plead and prove with clear
and convincing evidence the damages resulting therefrom;

c.

confused the jury and permitted it to find fraud and breach and award
damages on matters not properly submitted to it, including but not limited to
claims related to the will of Christa Beguesse Rammell; and

d.
8.

confused the jury with respect to the Defendant's Counterclaim.

This affidavit is made in support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the alternative, for a New Trial.
FURTHER SAITH THE AFFIANT NAUGHT.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 2
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
: ss.
)

~

On this~~ day of April, 2012, before me, a Notary Public for the State ofldaho, personally
appeared DAVID E. ALEXANDER, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this
Certificate first above written.

(SEAL)

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 3

417

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

the~day~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
12, I served a true, correct and copy
of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 4

fr U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
t ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
)k[Yacsimile (208) 529-9732
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-61 01
Fax: (208)232-61 09

VILLE COWHY.IDAh"-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified
personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-2767

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENTNOTI\t1THSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR NEW TRIAL

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________ )
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually, ("Mr. Rammell") and
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, ("the Estate")
and CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, ("CBI") by and through their attorney of
record, David E. Alexander, and hereby submit their Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, their
Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Motion is
supported by Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 1
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Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the alternative, for a New Trial, along with the Affidavit of
Counsel filed herein.
Dated this

sf!:

'2!_ day of April, 2012
RA.CINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &
BA EY, CHARTE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

. }j_!;/

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t~y of April, 2010, I served a true, correct and
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. A vondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

1>( U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
~ Facsimile (208) 529-9732

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL -Page 2
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-61 01
Fax: (208)232-6109
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)
)
)
)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified
personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -09-2767

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR NEW TRIAL

COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually, ("Mr. Rammell") and
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, ("the Estate")
and CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, ("CBI") by and through their attorney of
record, David E. Alexander, and hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, or in the alternative, their Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 ofthe Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, as follows.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 1
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INTRODUCTION

Defendants contend that this Court should enter a judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative, order
a new trial based on, but limited to, the following:
1.

The damages assessed against Defendants were excessive and appeared to have been

given under the influence of passion or prejudice;
2.

The evidence was insufficient to justifY the verdicts and awards made in favor of the

Plaintiff;
3.

The verdicts and awards made in favor of the Plaintiff were contrary to the law;

4.

The Court erred in submitting jury instructions and a verdict form which,
a.

permitted the jury to find liability in gross against all of the Defendants for
discrete acts of fraud allegedly committed by individual Defendants;

b.

permitted the jury to assign damages in gross on discrete fraud claims for
each of which the Plaintiff was required by law to plead and prove with clear
and convincing evidence the damages resulting therefrom;

c.

confused the jury and permitted it to find fraud and breach and award
damages on matters not properly submitted to it, including but not limited to
claims related to the will of Christa Beguesse Rammell; and

d.

confused the jury with respect to the Defendant's Counterclaim;

5.

The Court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict;

6.

The Court erred in submitting Plaintiffs fraud claims to the jury;

7.

Plaintiffs counsel made improper arguments which invited the jury to decide the case

contrary to the law.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 2
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 50(b) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than
fourteen ( 14) days after entry of the judgment and may be made whether or not the
party moved for a directed verdict .... A motion for a new trial may be joined with
this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative, in conformance with
the requirements of Rule 59(a); and a motion to set aside or otherwise nullifY a
verdict or for a new trial shall be deemed to include this motion as an alternative ....
"A motion for judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) is treated as simply a delayed motion
for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763,
727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). A judgment n.o.v. "can be used by the district court to correct its error
in denying a directed verdict." Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478-479, 797 P.2d 1322, 1327
(1990). The central question on review in a judgment n.o.v. is whether, after viewing the evidence
in light most favorable to the non-moving party, "the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative
value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the jury." Smith v. Praegitzer,
113 Idaho 887, 890, 749 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). "A judgment n.o.v. should be
granted when there is no substantial competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury" (Brand

S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,732-733,639 P.2d 429,430 (1981)) and when there is "but one
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached" (Be co Constr. Co. v. Harper

Contr., 130 Idaho 4, 8, 936 P .2d 202,206 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)(citing Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727
P .2d at 1192). Rule 50(b) is intended to give "the trial court the last opportunity to order the
judgment that the law requires." Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192.
"If an alternative motion for new trial is made with the j.n.o.v. motion, the trial court must
rule on both motions separately." Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Contr., 130 Idaho 4, 8, 936 P.2d 202,
206 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). The standard of review on a motion for a new trial is different than that
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 3
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for a motion for a judgment n.o.v. Under Rule 59( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues
in an action for any of the following reasons:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings ofthe court, jury or adverse party or any order of
the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which
the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justifY the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against the law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new trial based upon any of
the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be accompanied by an affidavit
stating in detail the facts relied upon in support of such motion for a new triaL Any
motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefor with
particularity. On a motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
direct the entry of a new judgment.
When determining whether to grant a new trial, the court is not bound by the substantial
evidence standard as it is in the judgment n.o.v. context. BrandS Corp., 102 Idaho at 733,639 P.2d
at 431. Additionally, the court is "not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable" to the
non-moving party. Nations v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, 113 Idaho 568,572,746 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). Rather, "unlike a motion for a directed verdict orjudgrnentn.o.v.,
the trial court has broad discretion to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and it may
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set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation of the evidence, even though there is
substantial evidence to support the verdict." Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416,422, 835 P.2d 651,
657 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). Plaintiff's claims fail whether analyzed under the judgment n.o.v.
standard or the new trial standard.

ANALYSIS
I.

ALL OF ABI'S CLAIMS lVIUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
A.

ABI's Claims Are Not Ripe and It Failed to Demonstrate Any Damages

ABI's claims must fail because it did not present any substantial evidence of damages.
Without any damages, ABI' s claims are not ripe. Even if they are ripe, absent any showing of
damages, all of ABI's claims must fail against all Defendants.
"The traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case
presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that
there is a present need for adjudication." Noh v. Cenarrusa (in Re Action to Determine
Constitutionality ofIndian Gaming Initiative), 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). "A
justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract
character; from one that is academic or moot." Wylie v. State, 253 P.3d 700,705 (Idaho 2011)( citing
Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd ofEduc., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912
P.2d 644,649-50 (1996)).
In Noh v. Cenarrusa, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "there [was] not a real controversy
at this point because Proposition One is simply a proposal. It has not become a law. There is no
present need for adjudication. If Proposition One does not pass, there will not be a need for an
adjudication as to its validity. This case does not meet the elements of the traditional ripeness test."
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Noh, 137 Idaho at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220.
In the fraud context, "fraud alone, without damage, is not actionable, nor is damage without
fraud, but when the two concur, an action lies. The party seeking damages or relief on the ground
of a false representation must show that he has been damaged or prejudiced because of it." Cooper

v. Wesco Builders, 76 Idaho 278,284,281 P .2d 669, 672-673 (1955) (citing 32 A.L.R.2d 226, Fraud,
§ 23; 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 103, pp. 408-409) (internal citations omitted); see also 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud

and Deceit§ 272. Additionally, "there is no damage where the position of the complaining party is
no worse than it would be had the alleged fraud not been committed." !d. (citing 23 Am.Jur. 994,
Fraud and Deceit,§ 175). Finally, "damages must also be certain, ... such as can clearly be defined
and ascertained." Id (citing 23 Am.Jur. 995, Fraud and Deceit,§ 176).
The law pertaining to damages as outline above applies with the same force in the breach of
contract and warranty context. The burden is "upon a plaintiff in a breach of contract case to prove
not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount
and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty." Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 2012 Ida.
LEXIS 63 (March 2, 2012) (citing Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d
604, 611 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
Here, April contended at trial that ABI had been damaged because she could not sell the
business. There was absolutely no proof at trial that April could not sell the business. April admitted
that she has never actually attempted to sell the business. In fact, the only evidence at trial was that
Linda Diamond-Raznick told April that she could sell ABI with Ms. Diamond-Raznick' s permission,
just as April's mother and CBI had done in with April. Thus, like the claimant in Noh v. Cenarrusa,
ABI' s claim for damages is purely speculative and is not ripe as ABI has not suffered any damages.
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Furthermore, April failed to demonstrate any reason ABI is worse off now than it would be
had the alleged fraud and breaches not been committed. April claimed that business was only worth
$250,000 when she bought in 2003, notwithstanding that ABI has made approximately $3 million
in gross revenues since 2003. April vaguely contended that she understood the Defendants to
represent that the business owned files worth more than a million dollars. April failed to testifY of
any actual misrepresentations made by any Defendant as to the value of the business to ABI. Even
if it can be somehow construed that the Defendants did testifY concerning the business's worth, it
is well settled that representations as to value of property are by their nature opinions, not statements
of fact, and therefore cannot be considered warranties nor actionable representations of fact. See

Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553,556 (1886); Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1924);
Fisherv. Davidhizar, 2011 Utah App. 270,263 P.3d 440,447 (2011); and 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and
Deceit§ 173 (2012).
As a result, all ofABI' s remaining claims against all Defendants must fail because the matter
is not ripe and there is no substantial competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury as a
matter of law. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 50(b).
In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses,
must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). The jury's award of damages is excessive and appeared to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. There is insufficient evidence to justifY the
verdict and such was against and in error ofthe law.
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B.

The Statue of Limitations Bars ABI's Fraud and Breach Claims

ABI's fraud and breach of contract and warranty claims against all Defendants must fail
because they are barred by the statute of limitations. As to fraud claims,
A three-year statute of limitation for fraud is established by I.C. § 5-218(4). The
statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d
360 (1991). Application ofl.C. § 5-218(4) does not depend on when the plaintiff
should have been aware that something was wrong; as used in the statute, "discovery"
means the point in time when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at 368. Actual
knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered the
fraud by the exercise of due diligence.

McCorkle v. NorthwesternMut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550,554-555, 112 P.3d 838,842-843 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2005).
As to breach of an oral contract and oral warranty claims, according Idaho Code § 5-217, an
action upon an oral contract, obligation or liability must be brought within four years. According to
Idaho Code § 28-2-725,
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4)
years after the cause of action has accrued ....
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made .... 1
Whether under Idaho Code§ 5-217 or § 28-2-725, "the statute oflimitations begins to run
at the time the cause of action accrues." (Memorandum Decision, datedNovember2, 201 O,page 14).
ABI filed suit on May 8, 2009. In order to survive against the statute oflimitations, ABI
must prove that April did not discover the alleged facts constituting fraud at least until Mary 8, 2006

1

See page 14 ofthe Court's Memorandum Decision, dated November 2, 2010 for
applicability ofidaho Code § 28-2-725.
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and at least until May 8, 2005 on the breach of contract and warrant claims.
i.

All Claims Regarding Library of Files Are Barred

April's story fails the smell test. April admitted that she knew that niether ABI nor CBI ever
owned the copyrights to the library of files. Thus, April and ABI always knew it did not own the
library of files it later claims she thought she owned. As a matter oflaw, the statute oflimitations
bars Plaintiff's fraud and breach of contract claims regarding the library of files.
ii.

All Claims Regarding PageMaker Are Barred

She further testified that her mother told people at the Exchange Group that she had not
invented the software sometime in 2003, which fact was confirmed by Steven Hall during the trial.
(ABI depo 84-85). April also admitted that she discovered that the proprietary software she had been
promised turned out to be a manipulated version of Adobe PageMaker when she installed a new
version ofPageMaker approximately four or five years prior to her December 17, 2009 Rule 30(b)( 6)
deposition. (ABI depo 22, 83-84). By her own admissions, April discovered or should have
discovered the facts constituting the alleged fraud well before May 8, 2006. ABI's fraud claims fail.
Likewise, ABI' s breach of contract and warranty claims must also fail. According to Idaho
Code§ 28-2-725 and§ 5-217, this is true regardless of when ABI or April's actually discovered that
CBI never owned proprietary software. Her cause of action accrued when the breach allegedly
occurred in 200, when the business was sold to ABI.
As a matter of law, the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's fraud and breach of contract
claims regarding the proprietary files.
iii.

All Other Claims, If Any, Are Barred

April testified that she had worked for CBI in highschool, in college and throughout her life,
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including in 2001 and 2002, prior taking over the company in 2003. She testified that she was
involved in all details of the company's operations and acted as president ofCBI for all of2003 and
thereafter. April has over 35 years of experience working in the printing and typesetting industry.
Overall, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that April know or should have known
through reasonable investigations, that ABI did not own the library of files or propriety PageMaker
software or any other basis for her fraud and breach claims, well before Mary 8, 2006 and May 8,
2005. All of ABI's remaining fraud and breach of contract and warranty claims against all
Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code§§ 5-218(4) and 28-2-725,
respectively. There simply is no substantial and competent evidence to rule otherwise. This Court
should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b ). In the alternative,
this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict
based up on its independent evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), (5), (6)
and (7). The jury's failure to bar ABI's claims by virtue of the statute of limitations is not justified
by the evidence to justify the verdict and was against and in error of the law.
C.

Opposing Counsel's Inappropriate Arguments

Plaintiff's closing argument focused on matters previously rejected by this Court. Namely,
that Mr. Rammell only contributed $500 to become a 50% member ofCBI, that the jury should find
fraud regarding the will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group.
Opposing counsel also made arguments to the jury not based on evidence presented at trial, in that
the Defendants defrauded ABI because if April died ABI would be worth nothing. Opposing counsel
further inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters. All of which tainted every claim before the
jury and urged them to find fraud without any basis in the pleadings, evidence or in the law and,
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instead, based on passion and prejudice.

II.

ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
"The correctness ofjury instructions 'is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free

review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been
given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."' Craig Johnson Constr., L.L. C.

v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d 648,651 (2006). "Where prejudicial
errors of law have occurred, however, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under Rule
59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence." !d. at 801,
at 652.

A.

Improper Verdict Form

It is impossible to detetmine, when reviewing the verdict form, what specific acts of fraud
the jury found that Mr. Rammell, CBI or the Estate committed. Without knowing who committed
what fraud, the jury could have reach of verdict based on evidence that was not substantial or
competent. There award could have been the product ofirrelevant evidence and evidence supporting
claims that were later dismissed, including the guaranteed contract, Mr. Rammell being a 50%
shareholder of the CBI, and the existence of a will, all combined with the confusing limiting
instruction made pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-202 and Rule 601 (b) ofthe Idal1o Rules of Evidence.
Furthermore, if the Court throws out one fraud claim based on this motion, it must set a new trial on
all remaining fraud claims because there is no way of telling what grounds the jury based it is verdict
on.

B.

Improper Jury Instructions

The jury was allowed to consider fraud on the basis of "misrepresentations as to the terms
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of the contract." One cannot, while negotiating a contract, "misrepresent" the terms ofthe contract.
A term is either agreed to or it is not. The instructions, by simply giving the jury a blanket fraud
instruction, permitted the jury to find fraud on this ground. Furthermore, the jury instructions were
confusing to the jury and permitted them to find fraud with regard to one alleged misstatement but
award damages for others.

C.

The Amount of Damages Award by Jury Are Not Supported by Evidence

The evidence presented at trial did not support the damages awarded by the jury. For fraud,
the jury awarded as damages a number that finds no support in any evidence of damages. Rather, the
amount awarded is exactly one-half of the value ofthe community property as it appears in the notes
of attorney Stephen Martin. This indicates that the jury awarded damages for fraud related to the will,
which was not proper. The jury in essence turned this trial into a retrial of the will challenge in
probate court.
Overall, this Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts of fraud pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses, must set aside the verdict based up on its independent evaluation and order a new trial
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). It is clear that the jury reached its verdict based on
confusion, prejudice and passion.

III.

ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST THE ESTATE FOR A LACK OF
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE
ABI's fraud claims against the Estate must fail because there was no evidence to sustain a

finding of fraud against the Estate. The only evidence of statements of fact made by Christa to the
Plaintiff carne from the Plaintiff. Pursuant to the Court's ruling on Defendant's objection pursuant
to Idaho Code § 9-202 and Rule 60 I (b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the Court's limiting
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instruction, the Plaintiff's testimony cannot be used to establish fraud against the Estate.
The only evidence other than Plaintiff's testimony came from attorney Stephen Martin. That
evidence, consisting of Christa's alleged representation as to the market value of her business in
1999 in the event of her death, was not a statement of fact but of opinion as to the market value of
the company in the event ofliquidation as part of the estate. There was no evidence that the figure
represented any individual's valuation of the company as a going concern or a valuation placed on
the business by the parties to the contract made five years later. It is not material to prove that the
later valuation was fraudulent. Besides, the statement was made to Mr. Martin, not to the Plaintiff.
In any event, it is well settled that representations as to value of property are by their nature
opinions, not statements of fact, and therefore cannot be considered warranties nor actionable
representations offact. Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553,556 (1886); Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3
F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1924); Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 Utah App. 270,263 P.3d 440,447 (2011).
This single piece of evidence fails to meet even one of the elements of fraud. Accordingly, the fraud
claims against the Estate must be dismissed for lack of competent evidence.
ABI's fraud claims against the Estate must fail for a lack of substantial and competent
evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on its fraud claims pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order a new trial
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7).

IV.

ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR
FAILURE TO PROVE ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD
ABI has failed to prove any and all the elements of fraud against all Defendants. "To

successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the following
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elements: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9)
resultant injury." Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931 (2007). All nine elements must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 250
(2010).
Based

on

this

Court's

rulings

the

only

remammg

allegedly

fraudulent

representations/omissions made by Mr. Rammell, Christa and CBI to April for the jury to decide,
are the following:
•

•
•

that CBI owned a library of proprietary titles valued at over $1,000,000 .
hat CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business .
that Christa has a will that allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon
Christa's death.

First and form most, April's testimony at trial was vague as to who made what
representations as to what. Like the verdict form, it is impossible to determine who is liable for
which representations.

Thus, having failed to show by clear and convincing evidence who

specifically represented what, it is contrary to justice to hold any of the Defendants liable for any of
the alleged fraudulent representations/omissions.

A.

Representations Regarding Ownership of Library of Files and Their Value

ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' representation
to ABI that CBI owned a ceratin library of titles and their value. April admitted at trial that she knew
prior to purchasing CBI that CBI did not own the copyrights to the titles. She also admitted that,
without owning the copyrights, ABI could not sell the titles. Such admissions struck a deadly blow
to her fraud claim regarding the ownership of the library of files and should have prevented it from
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going to the jury. Such was a reversible error.
April's claim is like a person who, after having raised horses all her life, decides to purchase
a horse from another horse dealer, and then later claims that she thought she was buying a unicorn.
Unicorns don't exist. Neither did CBI's ownership of any copyrights pertaining to the library of
files. April knew that and admitted knowing that prior to purchasing CBI. She worked for mother
is years past and spent her life in the typesetting and printing business. Regardless of the files
alleged value, the Plaintiff cannot claim the right to sell something she knew she didn't own and
couldn't sell. Such is irrational and unactionable and should never have gone to the jury.
ABI knew or should have known that the Defendants' alleged representations were false.

B.

Representations Regarding PageMaker

ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendant's representation
to ABI that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software. On page II, of its Memorandum Decision
and Order, dated November 2, 20I 0, this Court stated, "Whether the software used in the business
was proprietary or available to the public would reasonably have an effect on the purchase price of
the business." April repeatedly testified at trial that anyone could buy PageMaker (for $600) off the
shelf and that April had used PageMaker throughout her career. ABI knew or should have known
that the Defendants' alleged representations were false.
ABI also has failed to show that it relied and/or justifiably relied on the Defendants'
representations to ABI regarding the proprietary software.
In particular, April repeatedly testified that Mr. Rammell knew nothing about typesetting.
Mr. Rammell agreed. His background was in accounting and his limited involvement in CBI was
in preparing financial and tax information approximately one day a month. When ask what was Mr.
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Rammell' s involvement in CBI, April stated, "Not a thing." When ask which of Mr. Rammell' s
representations ABI relied on in purchasing CBI, April stated, "Not one iota." Although April later
stated that Mr. Rammell had concurred with Christa's alleged representations, it is clear that ABI
did not rely on Mr. Rammell' s representations regarding PageMaker (or the library of titles or their
value). By all accounts, he knew nothing about those things. No reasonable juror could find
otherwise.

C.

Representations Regarding The Existence of Christa's Will Allowing ABI to
Cease Payments to CBI Upon Christa's Death

ABI has failed to show that the Defendants' representation were false regarding the existence
of Christa's will that allowed her to stop making payments to CBI upon Christa's death. The
Plaintiff simply failed to get any of the terms of the will into evidence during trial to show whether
it allowed her to stop making payments or not. Plaintiff's fraud claim in this regard fails as a matter
of law. The issue never should have gone to the jury. Doing so allowed opposing counsel to urge
the jury to to "rewrite" Christa's will. Such was a reversible error.
Overall, all of ABI's fraud claims against all Defendants must fail for a lack of substantial
and competent evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on its fraud claims
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order
a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7).

V.

ABI'S FRAUD AND BREACH CLAIMS REGARDING THE LIBRARY OF
FILES MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
A.

Claim Precluded by Prior Summary Judgment

In 201 0, the Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants on Plaintiff's claim that
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she was defrauded into believing she would have a "guaranteed contract" with the customer. The
"guaranteed contract," as the Plaintiff described her understanding of it in her Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition, was that ownership of the library of proprietary files gave her control over the customer's
choice of who to use for typesetting services. She testified she understood that there was no written
or verbal contract with the Rutter Group. She testified she understood that Rutter and CBI "were
locked kind of into each other because Christa owned these files (the working typesetting files) and
ifthe Rutter Group wanted them back they would have to pay Christa for them." (ABI depo 53-54)
April understood that there was no enforceable written contract between CBI and the Rutter Group
which required Rutter to do business with CBI; it was just that Christa owned those files and Rutter
had no better choice. (ABI depo 56) She understood it was not a contract, but an "understanding"
between Rutter and CBI. (ABI depo 97) She admitted that CBI never told her that The Rutter Group
was obligated to do business with her. (ABI depo 51) She explained in detail in her deposition:
Q. ... What I would like to know now is to the best of your memory right now what was
represented to you about a guaranteed contract? How was that described to you?
A. It was described to me that
Q. Bywhom?
A. Christa and Ken both. We were around the kitchen table. That the Rutter Group
library was owned by Christa Beguesse, Incorporated. And because of that there was
a binding- a contractual obligation for the Rutter Group to continue to use Christa
and vice versa. It would be vastly too much money and time for them to ever try to
reinvent that type of wheel. It was 30 years in the making. And, again, for the meager
fee of $12,000 a month I could buy these files. And then, like I said, turn around and
sell them either back to the Rutter Group or to a third party.
Q. That was your guaranteed contract?

A. I was under the assumption that that was my guaranteed contract, yes.
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Q. Am I understanding you correctly that you agree there was not a contract and that
the Rutter Group -- there was a situation where the Rutter Group had no reasonable
alternative but to deal with your mother and therefore with you?
MR. BRUNSON: I object to the form ofthe question.
THE ·wiTNESS: We used, your verbiage, in the form of contract. What you just
said we would say contract.
Q. (BY MR. ALEXANDER) Okay. So is it fair to say, then, that you lmderstood that the
Rutter Group could, if it wanted to, simply take this business in-house or take it to another
vendor, but that it would be prohibitively expensive for them to do so?
A. Yes.
(ABI depo 80-81)
April Beguesse also testified in an affidavit that she knew that the customer possessed a
complete copy of those files, because CBI and later ABI always sent the customer a disc containing
a complete copy of the PageMaker-format files with each update for use in preparing the CD-ROM
version of the books. (April Beguesse Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment)
As noted above, the Court granted summary judgment on this claim, finding it undisputed
that Plaintiff knew there was no "guaranteed contract." However, at trial, the identical claim,
couched in different words but based on the same evidence and the same legal theory, was permitted
to go to the jury.
The Plaintiff argues that she did not receive "ownership" of the library of files. Her testimony
was that by "ownership," she meant the ability to control her customer's choice of who to use for
typesetting. Because she could not control who the customer would use, she believed she was unable
to sell the business, and therefore believed she was damaged.
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This is the identical claim as that on which the Court previously granted summary judgment.
Having heard the evidence, judgment for the Defendant is warranted on the law of this case, which
is that Plaintiff was aware at the time she entered the contract that she would have no ability to
control her customer's typesetting choices. Judgment n.o.v. on Plaintiffs claims of fraud and breach
of contract/breach of warranty based on the "library of files" issue should be granted in favor of the
Defendants.
B.

No Legal Basis for Claim of Fraud or Breach Regarding "Library of Files"

Judgment n.o.v. is also warranted on the grounds that the fraud and breach claims based on
"ownership" of the library of files is without a legal basis. The jury found a breach of contract and
warranty and may have found fraud regarding the alleged library of files. There was no legal basis
for either claim under the evidence presented at trial, and neither should have been sent to the jury.
The Plaintiff claimed she believed she was buying a legal right incident to "ownership" of the files
that does not and cannot exist. There is no way that a seller's representation of"ownership" can be
construed to mean possession of rights that cannot legally exist. Thus, her fraud claim is premised
on her misunderstanding of the law, or at best a layman's misrepresentation of the law. It is well
settled that fraud cannot be predicated on misrepresentations of law or as to matters of law, Glass

v. Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1998), affd, 163 F.3d 1361 (lith Cir.
1998) (applying Alabama law).
Before a claim can be sent to the jury to determine the fact question whether fraud was
committed, it is necessary to answer the precedent legal question whether the facts, if proven, even
state a claim for fraud. In this case, it was necessary for the Court to determine the meaning of
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"ownership" with respect to the files in question, to determine whether "ownership" of the property
involved in the transaction includes the rights the Plaintiff claims she did not receive.
The Plaintiffs claim was that she was promised "ownership" of the files, and that she could
later sell them to a third party "like Christa sold them to me." She claims she did not receive
"ownership" of the files because she could not sell them to a third party to do typesetting work for
the Rutter Group without the Rutter Group's permission. She concluded from this that, because
Plaintiff is unable to direct how the Rutter Group will use the files or who the Rutter Group may
work with, she cannot sell her business. The damages she claims result exclusively from this
supposed (and completely unproven) inability to sell the business.
A relevant fact established by the evidence is that Plaintiff was aware at the time she agreed
to purchase the business that CBI' s practice was to provide the Rutter Group with a complete copy
of the files in question in PageMaker format. She was aware that CBI did not have exclusive
possession of these files, as the customer had a copy. She was also aware that the files had no value
except for purposes of doing typesetting work for the Rutter Group.
Plaintiffs claim thus defines "ownership" of the files to include the right to sell the files to
a third-party typesetter and require the Rutter Group to use that third party's services, or to require
the Rutter Group to purchase the files from the Plaintiff even though Rutter already possesses the
files. It is the Defendants' supposed failure to deliver these alleged incidents of ownership that
constitutes the fraud claimed in this case.
However, there is no legal basis for a claim of ownership that includes such rights. Those
alleged rights are not and cannot be incidents of "ownership" of the files she purchased, for the
following reasons, and Plaintiffs belief to the contrary was unreasonable under the circumstances.
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As an analogy, if the Plaintiff claimed fraud because she expected "ownership" of the files
to include the copyrights to the Rutter publications, the claim would never have reached the jury
regardless of the facts shown, because ownership of a copy provides no legal basis for claiming
ownership of the copyright:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer ofownership ofany material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey
property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202. Thus, as a matter oflaw, no person could reasonably expect to receive "ownership"
ofthe copyrights in the Rutter Group publications under the circumstances present here. That belief
would be unreasonable as a matter oflaw, and no fraud could be found. To find fraud under those
circumstance would require evidence that the Defendants were knowledgeable of copyright law and
schemed to take advantage of Plaintiff ignorance.
Similarly, in the case as tried in this Court, the rights the Plaintiff expected to receive cannot
legally exist. The fault for Plaintiffs disappointment lies in the Plaintiffs ignorance of the law, not
fraud. Fraud under these circumstances can only be proven by evidence not presented here.
The following paragraphs will demonstrate that the control of the customer that Plaintiff
testified she expected to receive is not an incident of ownership of these files.
The files in question are electronic copies in PageMaker format of the customer's
publications. The customer, by assignment from the authors, owns the copyright. The files on
Plaintiffs servers are legally created copies. They do not themselves infringe the copyright, per
statute, because they are legally created. As such they may be lawfully owned, possessed and
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transferred; but they may not be used to infringe the copyright, any more than one's ownership of
a copy of the latest bestseller gives one the right to photocopy it for a friend. Since files in
PageMaker format can only be used to prepare additional copies for publication, they have little
value except for that purpose. Since they can only be used lawfully for that purpose with the
permission of the copyright owner, the files have value only to a party with a business relationship
with the customer.
The Plaintiff asserts she believed she would receive "ownership" of the files. "Ownership"
means the "collection of rights to use and enjoy property." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed.
"Property" has often described as a "bundle of rights." Different kinds of property have different
rights associated with them. Ownership of rural acreage carries different rights that ownership of a
New York City condominium unit, ownership of an automobile, or ownership of a copy of a
copyrighted work. In this case, to understand the Plaintiff's claims, it is necessary to identify which
rights come along with "ownership" of the copies at issue.
Ownership of a copy of a publication implies the right to read it, the right to pass possession
of the copy to another (17 U.S.C. § 109(a)), but not the right to republish it, because that is an
incident of ownership ofthe copyright (17 U.S.C. § 106), not of a copy. The particular copies at
issue in this case are in a format usable only by typesetting software. They can only be used to make
more copies, which, to be lawful, can only be done with the permission of the copyright owner. (17
U.S.C. § 106) Therefore, the rights represented by "ownership" of these files only include the right
to use them for typesetting purposes with the permission of the copyright owner.
Since the Plaintiff does not own the copyright, the files naturally and obviously (and
admittedly) have no significant value apart from the copyright owner's permission to use them to
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typeset new editions. If the copyright owner withdraws its typesetting work from the Plaintiff- a risk
of which the Plaintiff was aware when she entered the agreement, as this Court previously ruled
it thereby also withdraws its permission to use the files for their intended purpose. The files would
then have no significant value to the Plaintiff. (Thus, the hypothetical damage resulting to the
Plaintiff in this case is in fact the result of a known business risk, not fraud.)
The Plaintiff would normally still have the right, as an incident of ownership of a copy, to
pass possession ofher copies to another, for whatever price she could obtain. This is the "first sale"
doctrine in copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which holds that the owner of a lawful copy may
transfer it to a third party. However, as noted, the files in this case would have no value without the
copyright owner's permission to use them, except perhaps to a potential copyright infringer who
intended to make unlawful copies. Thus, in this case there is no significant lawful value to the
owner's right to pass the files to another.
Furthermore, the copyright owner, to protect itself from this potential infringement, would
naturally insist as a condition of business that the files be destroyed or turned over to the copyright
owner when it withdraws its typesetting work from the Plaintiff. This is as testified to by Linda
Diamond Raznick. Since the files have no value without the typesetting, this would not damage the
Plaintiff.
Given the Plaintiffs knowledge that she did not have exclusive possession of the PageMaker
format files, and her knowledge that she had no agreement with the Rutter Group requiring it to use
her services, is there any way the Plaintiff could reasonably conclude that her "ownership" of the
files could give her the right to control Rutter's use of its copyright, or require Rutter to use her
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services? If not, can Plaintiff's legal mistake support a fraud claim? Can the Plaintiffjustifiably rely
on her own mistake of law?
The answer is no. This Court would never permit a fraud claim to go forward if the Plaintiff
claimed she thought "ownership" of the files gave her the copyrights. Yet in this case the Plaintiff
is claiming essentially the same thing: that she thought "ownership" of the files gave her "control
over who Rutter could do business with," to quote the Plaintiff's testimony from trial. There is no
such right in the bundle of rights associated with ownership of a non-exclusive electronic copy in
PageMaker format of the Rutter publications. Such a claimed right is inconsistent with the
customer's ownership of the copyright, which grants the customer the sole right to make and sell
copies of the work. (17 U.S.C. § 106) The right Plaintiff claimed she was to receive is thus contrary
to law. Ownership of a copy implies or creates no rights to control the use of the copyright (17
U.S.C. § 202). Since such a right could not exist under the law, Plaintiff's fraud claim must fail.

VI.

ABI'S BREACH CLAIMS AGAINST CBI MUST FAIL
To establish a breach of contract claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a contract existed

between plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant breached the contract; (3) the plaintiff has been
damaged on account of the breach; and (4) the amount of the damages. IDJI 6.10.1. Further, the
breach must be material. IDJI 6.11 defines a "material breach of contract," as that term is used in
these instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract.

A.

Plaintiff's Irrational Testimony Regarding the Terms of the Agreement

Plaintiff's testimony regarding the terms ofthe contract were vague and irrational. Plaintiff's
breach claims are inseparably connected and identical to its fraud claims. Thus, the same arguments
raised above regarding ABI' s fraud claims apply in the context of its breach claims (and hereby
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incorporated by reference as if set forth in full). In particular, even though Plaintiff has a lower
burden ofproof concerning the breach causes of action (preponderance verses clear and convincing),
it is against the clear weight of evidence for the jury to have conclude that CBI owned a library of
proprietary titles, that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software and/or that Christa has a will that
allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon Christa's death.

B.

Recovery Under Both Fraud and Breach Claims is Precluded

Plaintiff should not be allowed to recover under two separate legal theories. As the Court
noted on page 21 of its Memorandum Decision, dated November 2, 2010, "IfPlaintiffis successful
on the fraud claim, the contract may be considered void and there would be breach." The jury found
all three Defendants liable for fraud, therefore, Plaintiff's breach claims should be rejected as there
is deemed to have been no valid contract.

C.

Improper Verdict Form

Question 8 of the Verdict Form fails to specifY whether the breach was related to the library
of files or some other term of the agreement. Thus the jury could have awarded damages for CBI' s
alleged breach based on a term previously rejected by the Court (guaranteed contract, Mr. Rammell
was 50% owner of CBI, etc.) and which were not fundamental to the purpose of the contract.

D.

Damages Awarded by Jury For Breach Not Supported by Evidence

The $190.013.00 awarded to ABI on Question 8 is no supported by any evidence presented
to the jury. Nothing at trial supports that award, nothing.
Overall, all of ABI' s breach of contract and warrant claims against all Defendants must fail
for a lack of substantial and competent evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against
ABI on its breach claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing
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the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent
evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59( a)( I), (5), (6) and (7).
ORAL ARGUMENT is hereby requested, in which evidence and testimony may be
presented.
Dated

;/ j

this~of April, 2012
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2010, I served a true, correct and
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. A vondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

iQ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 529-9732

i{
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-6101
Fax: (208)232-61 09
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.

)

Case No. CV-09-2767

SUPPLEMENTAL
COUNSEL

AFFIDAVIT

OF

)
Kermeth Rammell, an inclividual, Christa , )
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
)
Estate of Christa Begue sse Rammell, by its )
qualified personal representative, Kenneth )
Rarrrouell.
)
)
Defendants.
)

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
ss
)

AARON CRARY, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon his o-vvn personal
knowledge, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am a licensed attorney in Idaho and work for Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey,

Chartered, counsel of record for the Defendants.
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2.

Attached hereto as Defendants' Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of an excerpt

from the transcript of the jury trial (which is opposing counsel's closing and rebuttal arguments
which occurred on April 13, 2012).
FURTHER SAITH THE AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this

j_ day of May, 2012.

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
: ss.
)

Subscribed and Sworn to before me on this pt day of May, 2012.

N£~0RIDAHO

Residing at: .J~ ~" ~
My Commission Expires: ~ c;l1,.;)ot<f
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2012, I served a true, correct and copy of
the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

[] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
( ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[W Facsirrrile (20 529-9732

c___lc
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.!N THE

Al?I>&ARANCES:

DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE O.E' IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE cotmTr OF BONNEVILLE

FOR THE

APRIL ljE.GUESSE,

:INC.

f

iU\

PLAI~TIFE' ~

Idaho

Corpor-ation~

Plaintiff/Coun te.:rdefe.ndan t,

*
RENNE'l'H lU\...l.!MELL, an indivi.dual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. 1 an Idaho
corpo.rati.on, THB ESTAX:Z OE' CElUSTA
:S:EGU:essg :RAMMELL, by ;its qualific:d

personal
Raeunell,

~epres~ntative,

CASE NO"

CV-09-2767

*

*

:SOR THE OE:E'E.NDANTS:

Kenneth

David E.
Attorney
Racine~

Bailey~

Defendants/Coun.terclail:rtants.

P .0.

Esq.

Olson, Nye, Budge
Chartered

&

Box 13.91

Pocatello, !daho 83104-1391
Phone: (208} 232-6101
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109
E-.Mail: dea@racine.law, net
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EXCE.Rl?l' FROM JURY TRIAL

APRIL 13, 2012
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HONORABLE JOEL E':.,

TINGEY PRESIDING
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JACP.: L. FULLER, CSR
Official Court Reporter
605 N. Capital
rdaho Fallsr Idaho 83402
Phone: (20B} 529-.1350 Ext. 1138
E-Mail:
jfullAr@co~bonnerville .id, us

quarterback who's working hard,

CLOSING ARGUME.NX BY THE ?LAINTIFF

APRIL 13 I

MR.

2012

May i t plea.s e the CoGrt

BRUNSON~

Now, some of the guys on the jury, I'm sure,

r

opposing counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jux:y.

We

and a lot of the women as well, I

have very much appreciated your ti:ne this week as Ye've

there's a lot of football fans.

been able to present to you au:r case.

those who don• t

oif,

and I

In fact,

I

Hard work pays

think the best analogy of hard work paying

off is in the sports .realm.

:t like sports ver.y much.

particulaxly like college football.

the recent years,

And in

just this last year actually, there is

the issues we're talking about here.
College football program, mid-sized college

boards.

He is number one. on all the recruiting

He is the man.

I

know

fo:t

is the part where they

kick the ball off and the two teams run at each other:

other and there's a lot of injuries with people who play
special teams and things like thAt.
But this other quarterback,

bee a use he 1 s a

scrapper, he 1 s doing the work, he's wanting t.o get.

foot.ball progra:ro, b.r:ings in the top quarterback recruit
country~

watch football,

don't

But special teams,

full speed and it's kicd o! kamikaze and they go at each

an example in the sports realm that applies to .some of

.in the

who's volunteering to be

on .special teams

In tact, when he comes to the

school, he has a press conference and he has his

involved, so he volunteers to be on special teams "'ven.
And the.r:e
the

a time to a point in the season where

unde:~si:ted

wins the tealtl,,
Now,

1

the scrapper, quartet"back takes over al,1d
He got. there. because- of the hard wo::-k.

the other quartel:back still has a sense of

publici.st there and he's going to be the quarterback to

entitlement.

take over the future.

another quarterback

benched, instead of working hard and in:steaci of helping

he'.s a little bit

out,

involved.

No'H,

there:'~:!'

And he-'s a little older,.

undersized,
there !irst.

he's

a little bit of .a scrapper, and he's

He wants to play"

inst.ead of getting his

But. because he got

teammates behind him, he

transfers.

And this new quarterback comes in and is

April Begues.se works hard for her business.

awarded the starting position because of who he is and

You heard her testimony about that.

because of his <;xeat accomplishment!! in high .school.

amount of time and effort and energy Ahe puts in on a

And he plays a little bit,

dai.ly basis.

But ultimate).y thi.s other

'tou heard the

She knows everything about the business
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It's with he-r when she wakes up in the morning and it's

trying to clai.t:t -- make clairos against f'acebook is these

probably wi t.h her when she wakes up in the middle of the

two ge.ntlemer. 11amed the Winklevoss twins.

night.

wh~n

And

she goes to bed at night 1 she has made

her bUsinesS better.

She'$ a SUCCe!ISfUl bQSinessper.soh.

They're these big athletic rowers and -- actually

Any increa!les in her business ate dtle to her

Olympic row!!!.ts who went to Harva.rd.

e;ffoxts~

real people.

Don't punish her for doing well in this
Let.'~

talk a litt-le bit about :Mr. Ra.mmell;

one of the Defendants in this case.
that's come

1\11 the t!';!totimolly

is that Mr. Rammell had nc part at

in is,

ell i.r. building the business we•.re t..811Xing about here.
He didn • t

contribute anything to the bus1 ness other than

h!.:; testimony that he paid $500.
I

asked himr

If you remembe:::, when

it was just a que.s:.:ion I

know what he was going to say.

But I

a.9ked~

Ue 's expecting

didn 1 t

He- couldn't

He's expecting a handout in this

ent.itlelne!lt.

One of my favorite recent movies is called
It's a Facebook movie.

The Socl«l Network.

lot oi you have seen it.

I'm sure a

ln that novie there are

several different parties

But the.re are several

a quote.

were the inventors of racebook,

again~

And

here,

she said she was also promised

April is the one

She's the one doing the work.

She's the one growing the business.
done nothing.
hut~

ine.s.s

Mr. Rammell ha!!

He has contributed nothing to the

but yet. he wants to be paid hund;:;ed::t of

1

thousands of' dollars.
Now,

in this ca.se what was promised and

agreed to is in dispute.

You've heard two different

wa:!!l

1.3 million dollars~

just comparing- it to the

cast of characters we have here,

money ac:ttJally from Mark Zuc:kerberg ~

And one of these particular groups that is

If you guys

you would have invented

Fa:cebook."

versions of the facts in this

Facebocd: _

Jl..~nd

This is

He says, "You kno1,.1, you really dontt n.<i!e.d a

forensic team to get to the bottom of this.

different parties vying to clai:rn ownership and to claim
the founde:::: of

these

Facebook~

this i:s what Nar!..: zuckerberg says in the movie.

and this is probably why I

like it, becau::;e t'm a lawyer.

But anyway,

Winklevoss twins .make this claim t.o fame,

working for the business.

he has a sense of

They're actually

The movie is t'iction, but it's based

loosely on What actuallY happened.

asked him if he

could even name one former client o:f CBl.
do that.

!

And any of

you that have seen the ntovie are familiar with them.

clear

this issue.

April's testimony

She said she waes premised

ownership of the lib,.a;ry of files valued between 1 and

twa~

is helpful.

And so I'm not gcing tc go through all

proprietary software created by Christa 8egues.se

because it's a pa:::ket and you can read them, but there • .s

Ramme11, and she was also told that the payments would

a :fe'# 1 do want to go th:::ough with you.

~;ease

to our claim.o in the case, the legal

upon death.

Those were all representations made
al.l pa::-t of the deal that was made

to her and they

that'll be

brought to you.

between ABI and CBI.

Uow,

And they relate

c1~itns

The first one is Jury Instruction: Number 21.

in this case the Defendants are trying

The Judge issued

instruction in this case that says,

to argue that possession is the ,sarr.e thing as owne;;-ship ~

"Statements made: by Christa Begue:gse may not t:e

And the easiest eKample I can use with this is a car

conside:ted as

lease.

estate of Christa Beguesse.

You can go down and lease a car and you g<!t to

use the car, but you don • t
the lease 1
That's

guess Wh<.! t.

own it.

And at the end of

'fou have to give the car back.

not the case here.

Here i t was represen'ted to

April Seguesse tha:t she owned ce:rta1n files,
doesnft own them.

and she

And all the. evidence that's coma in

on that point has established that she does not own
them~

Rutter Group,

in t:his case Linda Diamond, has

testified that they can demand for those files back at
any time and April
N;:')W~

~<ould

be u,sed for any other

.Jt:~dge

go th:toogh

supporting a claim against the
Such evidence, however, may

purpose~''

And what i.s meant by

that is, April has testified Christa said tc her cer-t.!!in
things~

And although those -- that testimony, based on

this instruction, cani:t be used against ou2; claim
against. the estate, because we have a claim against the

estate of Christa Beguesse., i t can be use-d aga.inst the
corporAtion, CBI.

And that's merely the point I wanted

to make with that instxuction.

Instruction -- you have sever.al instructions

get no compensation for them.

you just heard the

evid~:;:nce

dealing wi tb

ou~

fraud claim.

Instructions

some jury instructions and it is a mouthful of legal

Instroction !'lumber 29 is the :m.ain instruction dealing

terms and it. is qui t.e confusing.

with the fraud claim.

little bit here,

but

th-:se with you.

And

that•s

Ahd bear with

it is important to go tbxough

'll

try to do so in

--one, doesntt in:gult you;r intelligehc:e and,

requirements,

And it goes through 10

and all the facts that support these 10

requirements for fraud are present here.

And I want to

go through those with you just brief 1 y because I'm going

453

10

to talk tno:re in depth in a minute about each of these

testimony from April that it was just a program that.

things, but. 1 just want to J<ind of lay the groundwork

could be purchased off the shelt,

w:i.th you"

statement regarding proprietary software,

So please bear with me,
The f'irst requirement is that the Defendants

stated a fact to the plaintiff.

He.rer as

So the

that she had

come up wt th thia thing on her own, was false.
As to the payments ceasir:::g: on death, we • re

I've just

being sued by them to :pay them for those payments.

indicated, we've identified three critical fact.s that

The third .requirement is_,. the statement

they stated -- one; that the ownership of the library of
files was valt:ed at 1 to 1. 3 million dollars, that we

l'tl.aterial so it vas import.ant.

wo;:~ld

important.

be getting ownership;

Page-Maker.

two, proprieta:r-y .software

the statements were

The statement regarding -- .all those

created by Christa; and three, the payments would cease

stat.eme-nt.'l are what brought April out to Idaho to do the

on death.

deal.
1'he

::~econd

.statements be false.

Yo:.J heard that testimony.
The fou..rth requirement is, the Defendants

:t:equi:r:ement of that is that those
WelL

either k;nl!t\4 the st.at.ement

in this case the testimony

\ll<'lS

false or wez:-e unaware

that '.s come in -- and it ts testimony th:tough the Rutter

whether the statement was true at the time the statement

Group, who • s

wa:s made.

the customer -- that statement about

ownership of files was false.

The Rutter Group bas

testified that they own all those files.
that.

Mr~

recall

Rammell~

if you

also at trial.

But one

the Idaho Falls attorney who actually

represented Hr.

So

And

tha~

critical one was the testimony we heard f:rotn Steve
Martin,

and r eVeh brought out his deposition on this

point -- he testified if the- Rutter Group claims
ownership 1 he wouldn't di.spttte it or argue about it.

est;;~blished

this was

could apply to this particular requirement.

:tmd not only

when he was askeq about this,

Now- 1

lots of different pieces of evidence

there

Rammel! and Christa Beguesse.

And he

testified that they placed a $40,000 value on their

clearly in this case April doesn't own those files.

business in 1.999.

There's been no evidence presented to suggest that she

deal was done.

Now,

that was shortly before this

And then you heard additional testimony from

does.

As to the proprietary softwarer you've beard

Mr. Hammell clarifying that.

He said,

"The reason we

12
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did that is be;;ause we didn •t teallY own anything other

the statut::e of limitations.

than some equipment valued at about $3500 and we: had

ot th.at before.

about that much cash ill the bank."

And that es ti~bl ishes

Some of you may have heard

And o,ohat t-he statute of lintitation:s is,

is i t says ir: the legal world you

that they knew at that t.i!Ile that they didn't own a

claims within a

library of files valued at betVJeen 1 and 1.3 million

fraud claim,

hav~

to bring your

reasonablt1 ti:me essentially.

And

wi.th a

a.s 34.1 goes thrcu~h, the time to bring

your claim is within three years ·from. the time you

dollars.

Now,

the fifth requirement:, the Plaintiff

did not know that the .statement was false.
testified that lll:he didn't know that.

discove.t

the ft""aud.
And you heard testimony ;i.n

1\p:r-il.

She also testified

this c.ase from

Ap.ril Beguesse; and she said, "Itve worked-- the

that she was relying on that, which is the :seventh

transition occurred in 2004, and l continued to work

requirement.

with my mother and Linda.''

I'iU gett.inq ahead o!; myself a little: bit.
The sixth requirement ac·tually is that the

Defendants intended the Plaintiffs to rely on it.

Nell,

idea that she didn t t

had

passed~

they wanted her to come out and do this deal,

after he.r

her to call Linda Pi.atnand.

their retirement.

April acted :reasonabJ.y in this case.

That's !or you to determine.

B'..lt that's ,,..hat the

And then we get into damages.

claim.

and that conversation prompted
And you'll r:ecall the

testimony that April gave about her conversation with

Lind .a Diamond where she testified that • s

the first she

ever learned that the Rutte.r Group owned those files,

evidence sho\>ts.

<>bout damages in a little bit.

until she had --

after she had a conver3ation with l':lr. Rammell shortly

l1.r _ Rammell testified at some length.

This was tJart of

And she testi.fied she had no

own those files

But that's

And I '11 talk
fraud

And all those elements that I just went through

have been established in this ca.se 1 and many of them are
not even in dispute,
There •s another instruction related to fraud
and that is 34.1 and it's dealing with a topic called

And that happened in late 200£!, ea.rly 2009.
filed

the lawsuit in this matter in 2009.,

Well, we

:so clearly

we're within the three years.
She acted reasonably.

There was no reason

for her to be inquiring as to that ownership issue
because she was building he.::: business.v
seeking to sell it.

She wasn't

There was no reason for her to have

454
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first line of Instruction Numb~r 25,

until

that conversation with Linda at any time ot.her

agreem~n.t

she became aware after her conversation with Mr. Rammall

of the oral

that something '-'as:n't right,

anci April Be9ue.sser Inc.,

she

~-

and she acted promptly when

after she found that out.

Now, tha!::. r s

in dispute."

was actually agreed is in dispute.

fr<~ud

the

act.uall':{ agreed was cral.

clain ~

itt:~

insofar as the facts
things.

ve;r;y l'dmilar to our fraud claim

that apply.

because I've already said it twice.

agreement.

But lt's those

The Court has determined -- and it's not

\lie' ;;e going to have to

And so we have to

weigh everybody 'a. te.:l timony here and figure out who you

telling the truth a.bout the deal.

think

And the -- but. the statute of limitations issues -- and

And,

the requirements for breach of contract are a little hit
dif!erent.

That 1 s why we couldn't

disputed in this case -- that the.re 'Was an oral

thos~

three elements that exist in our :fraud clairn.

things

And so what

But al:Jo what. was

just look at the writ.ten document and say, "Wellf that's
the deal .....

It's the same three

And I'm not going to go back through

"The terms

And that's why we had to

listen to everyone's testimony.

We also have what's called a breach of

contract claim 1 and

it. says,

bet\>"een Christa Beguesse, !nc.,

in fact 1 i f you go further down in

it says, ''The

Let ttle touch on that just really briefly~

Instruction Number 25! the last line,

If you look at you:r I:1struction Number --

Court prav;loU$ly ruled that E.:r::hibit 2 in this vase, u

bear with me -- 24 and 25, those are the two pri.marily

deals

just. describes what a contract is-.

the

i$ disputing that t.he.re 'Was a contract between

ABI and CBI.

which vas the lease agreement that had the blank

.At1d on Number 24 i t just

dealing with the contract .

That's not in dispute.

attachments and nothing in there,
contract....

No one in

"is not an enforceable

So those are the br:each of contract

instructions.

Sa really 24 is

to the stututc of limitations issue

NoW 1

helpful, but there's really no dispute that there is a

I was talking abont with fraud, well, in a breach of

contract.

contract guess what.

instruction

The rules are a little bit

N"umber 25 gives you a little bit more

different than they are in .fraud.

bec~use

our claims the statute of

it talks about Hbat the Cou:tt has
And i ! you .read just the

done alxeady in this case.

little bit. different.

In .tact, !or each of

limit~tions

requirements are a

And so you're going to have to

16

15

carefully look at these instructions.

breach of warranty claim. is

The one that

applies to our bx:each of contract claim and actually ou:r
breach of \-la:n:anty claim regarding the library of files
regarding the p:t:orni.s:e to sell

t'l&

1

a library of files

valued at 1 million to 1.3 million, as .to that specific
claim,

34.2: is the one that applies.

And what you'll

Ihstruction Number 28.

I,ll just re.t'er you to that.

But it state!:!,

is a -- an express waJ:":ranty is a warranty created by
wards or actions of the selle;r;.'1

And so the same three

representations we're dealing with here tie' re dealing

with under: our breach of warranty.

Let me rephrase

see as you read that, it says# "The statute of

that.

limitations fo.r Pl.aintiff 's alleged breach. of contract

not part of our breach of warranty claim.

regarding a library o! .files is taut

y~ars

.;~nd

begins to

.run from the time ABI knew of the Rutter Gr:oup 's claim
of ownership inte:cest in the libT.ary of files."

Actually, the payments ceasing on death,

lib:r:a.ry of files

a~d

Okay.

And

it•s ju.5t the software on that one.

think l •ve bored everyone with my

I

discussion on the law.

the ownership ihtere.st was,

stated~

conversation I
bet-ween

that

just talked to you about a min\.\te ago

April Beguesse and Linda Diamond; and the

Now,
software,

there~s

as to our claim regarding pl:'op:rietary

'l'hat one is Number 35 1 and it

goes through some detailed requireJllents.

your attention to i t now.

Okay.
claim"

I

I '11 just d:.aw

doh't waht to go thr:ough

you~

We a.lso have a breach of warranty

And breach of warranty is very similar to breach

of co!ltract.

happened here is in dispute.

the jury

.And the instruction that applies to-

think what

~-

as I

I don't get. to do it.

And it's up to you,
Opposing coun!'!el

It's up to you, the jury, to

decide t.he credibility of wi tnesse.s.

And one thing X $tr-uggle with in this case

actually a separate statute of

limitations on that one.

all of that with

l'1hat

And so

what the parties have agreed to is in dispute..

does-n't get to do i t .

lawsuit was filed within that fou.r- yea.r:s,

that's

It 1 s just the

That's Instruction r.h:nnber 2 B.

here the only testimony you heard about when ABI knew
agalnl

And

"A warranty

is,

no one wants to disrespect their elder:s; and I

certainly did!1' t
the trial.

want to do \:hat through the

of

And then in add.itian to Hr. Rammellts kind

of overt attempts, r thought, in this ca.se to kind of

make you feel sorry .for him,
thot.:lght,

that. also

e l i tt1e

because he brot.~ght up his poor

health and he broug'ht up his

supposed povet:ty.

45~5

Don't

And 1 1 m not

let that testimony sway your deliberations.

aware of any adage or: p:roverb that suggests that being
Becaq~e

oldar makes you somehow mor:e honest.

let~

handwriting.

trial,

the stand.

which is Exhibit 27a, which you'll have.

So this i.s

And you saw this at the trial.

stock ownership is a hundred pe.rcent1

~nd

listed is Christa Beguesse.

And if you

!ir~t.

tried to claim he did.

-- remember# I

read i t to him;

car' :s

de.rnonstrating

Rananell about docuruents

intellectual property.

to claim that there was such documents.

We al.so heard Mr. RamrneU. -- Hr. Rammell

again his testimony contradicted.

that -- and yott remember hearing the

Now,

testimony about this -- that Mr. Rammell told April that

He started

Again I pulled

read i t to him, and

au.t his deposition testimony, I

admitted t.o telling Aprii that after there. was a -- they

had to

and his deposition testimony

asked Hr.

clearly

.!.JO

A.nd then

published the deposition and then I

contradicted his te.stitnohy at trlal.

the only
And

that was not consistent with his previous testimony.

conve.rs~tion

at
I

look on here, yot.;.'lJ. see that shareholder percentage of

ha.d a

:I: didn't

valuation of the business before selling it to ABir he

And then we actually looked at the doct.nue.ntr

shar~holder

lo::1.g~

He wasn't up there very

But >rhen I asl-:ed him if he•d performed a.

think.

also testified that he had even

signE'ld some of tht:l tax returns.

Exhibit 27a.

Again, another

When I asked Hr. Ra:n.:nell -- I had him up

to testify that he had provided tax information !'or the
tax retu:rns lind that he was the one that had generated
H~

the

instance of a contradiction by Hr. Rammell.

owner in the business of CBI, and then he also went

tha"t. information.

w~s

there actually was a 19:9.9 will; and Mr. Rammell

admitted that there wa.s a 19:99 will.

a 50 percent

Mr. Rammell testified that he

that he told April that that

Wellf as Mr. Martin late.r testified in the

Ramme:l a nO what

did -- what we heard from him at the trial of this
:matter.

but

only will that exist.ed.

the credibility of the witnesses in this case.

Specifically let' .:s talk about Mr.

holographic lff"i1ls;

And Mr, Ramrnell told -- and you hea:rd him

testify to this_,

.Let • s talk about

s talk about that.

abot.<+~

didn't talk

what a holographic will is, it'!J. a will don-e in your own

it is up

to yot.J. to we.igh the credibility of the witne.sses.

So

the only will that e;;:;isted wa.s a 2007 holographic will.
And

j

u:~-t

these deposit1ons are done Uhder oath,

like they were sworn in here when they -- before

20
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they testified.

And perhaps the biggest contradiction

come:s from. his -- the deposition itself,

And I took

me a little bit,

And in this trial the -- another

exhibit that was admit ted was E.xhihi t

45.

som.e time in the trial to point out that we started his

won't have t..his big huge blow-up with you

deposition in the afternoon of one day and then

J:·ecall 1

continued i t the second day.

testified -- and you heard this

the files.

R~mro.ell

r

Ratnmell

different values they gave on things.

and I .read it into the

testified he didn"t know who owf\ed

That was his testimony.

And then he said he

would not argue with the Rutter Grot..<p or Linda Diamond
as to who owned them.

And he said r

"! have no way to

valuate -- evaluate. the value of those files."

Martin go through these,
there for 40r000.

900,000.
and that

That was

his testimony the !i.rs t. day.

after
he

said -- he then took the positionr "Well, wait.
the files,'' and that they weref
the Va.!Ue of the company 1

~nd

in fact,

CBI

part of

then he a.dmi tted to

telling that to Ap::il Beguesse.

Mr,

That's a big diffe-rence

he was running out of money.

You heard his test.imony that
And that kind of pet;plexed

So the total value of the estate

at some

went through the

l~ngth

I

think: you'd recall

And as we did "that, he testified to the

o.t CBI; and he testified that he l;"eceived

between two hundred

CBI received between

240~

000 -co

224 1 000 dollars a year of revenue .from 2000 to 2003.
And then he al.so testified about the business income;

Ahd that business income from 2000 to 2003 was $461 1 000.
that £rom 2004 to

And then it's undisputed in this
200B ABI paid $750 fOOO to CBI.

Now 1

you heard other testimony from

Ramrnell in this trial.

in 1999.

And then

from just. one day to the next.
Nmt,

And that was neve::: really put into dispqter
w~s

me doing that.

when I w.!l.s even asking him the questions,

the busine$!1

But the total value of the estate wa.s

car t:ax :return-s: with Mr . .Rammell.

On the second day and, as I pointed out, !

he had a chance to talk to his a<:torney, he said

.And I h<'ld Steve

And you can

in 1999 was $900r000.

So he

could not have told April what the value was.

thinkr

But, if you

this is fron Steve Martin .and this i$ the

exhibit that cam..e into evidence -chat establishes the

And on the. first day Mr.

reco.rd -- t·fr.

Now, you

cla:tm~ad

l added that up.

business income,

which was

I

added up the

4€1~000;

the -$900 1 000 in the estate; and thert l
.$/50,000; and that comes

l

added up

adde.d that to the

to a total of $2.1 :million.

456
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And here he wa.s testifying that he was out of money

He

didn tt offer any exp1.5natioh as to where the money went.
just expects evel:"yone to believe him that he's out of

Ke

:blo\.1, consider r.he testi1:1ony of Renee Heller.
Renee Heller was just a nousekeepe.r.

And he came into coul:'"t and he also swore
oath to tell the t.ruth.

He swore

testified he knew Mt-.

Rammell,

M:r. Rarnmell and Christa Beguesse Rammell

12 years.

That's what she testified to.

if you'll

one of the times in trial,

recall,

another attorney in our office, Lindsay
to the stand; and she read Ms.

Heller~

testimor:y from a different. hearing.

:Now,

You,

come up

Ratnmell,

the ju.:cy,

g~t

determine the

But. in this case

hear that from N.r.

Rammell himself.

try to .say, "Well, Trulson has it wrong.
truth."

And this is

She said -- she was referring that Mr. Rammell

Alls

We clidn 1 t

liar~

dealings with him.

"He told me that he '<ta.s

Now,

He was going to destroy her."

That was yesterday morning, and that didn't last very
thir.Y. everyone was a little .surprised.

I

and off quick.

I

'I'hat•s

heard di.fferent

One of the key

witnesses in this case -- and it was unfortunate she

wow,. he

think he might have been here a

It may have been the shortest,

minute or 90 .seconds.

teLl. the

who's had business

th:roughout the trial

testimony from diffexent people.

Then we heard testimony :from Rick 'I'rulson.

"Well,

01:' we

He didn't

I

That's not my words.

said.

long.

didn't

heard from someone who's under oath was t.hat he

is a pathological

someone who came here unde:r oath~

bit.ch~

WB-

hear any evidence to dispute that.

was referring to April Oegues.se, and thi.s is what he
He said -- she said,

and then h!'!

said, "Mr. Ranuuell is a

hear from any other witnesses to come in and say,

didn 1 t

And at that time

sworn under oath to tell the truth.

goi:1g to get that

and he te.!l't.i!ied

Hr. Rammell has a tendency to tell the truth."

a portion of her

And this is what she testified.

H~

credibility of witnesses.

that 1 had

Heller offered tha;; testimony 1 she was under oath,

quote.

Mr~

pathological liar."

for

this

Lofgran~

An.d he

he test-ified he had

he tsd business dealings with Nr. Ra;nmellr
offered this opinion.

Renee Heller:

worked for.

a

oath.

pex:sonal interactions with

money.

M.s.

all trial,

couldn • t be here -- wa.s Linda Diamond.

And

and had her :read parts of hex deposition 1

but it ndght be the l'!lost compelling testimony we heard

again~

did the same thing vhe.re we put Us. Lofgran on the stand

question and answer thing.

and we did the

And I know that sometimes as
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jurors that can be hard to follow because we're just

pleased with April,

again, that's April's work.

reading along and it's sometimes ha:rd t.o catch

April's hard 1</ork.

She•s the

everything.

establish that relationship.

But she said a lot of i:t:tportant: thing!! in

her testimony, a lot of things that p.rove
She said Th':}mson Re•.1ters

ABI • s computers.

Now,

books in this case.
books.

Mr. R,ammell.

owns the files

ho one • s disputing who o•,.;ns the

/l.nd she also testified

c~early

to a third party.

that

She

Ra.mmell had no involvement with CBI.

She te.sti.ried that

significantly she testified this,

what she termed a vendor at will,

::Jhe said she

met~.nt

by that is that

that~

tile:<:~

again,

is because

th~

theo Rutter Group

is .siqnificant.
l'his was

Rutter Group awns those

any time for any purpose.

and that

a<;~ain

Christa

M:r:. Rammel1

California.
And thls i.'! 'What Linda said of the
Quote,

she said that there was :5ome

agreement between April and Chxista and that April owed
him money and was not paying hila the mone-y -- owe-d
Christa the money and had stopped paying the money when
she died.

they're going to a.rgae and suggest,

~

She testified tha::::

went out to Linda -- to speak with Linda Diaro.or.d in

conversation.

She stated that the Rutter Group could le.ave at

Now,

a~ain,

Hr. Rammell carne out.

And what

could go whereve-r: they want for typesetting services:

and

She also tes-tified about a conversation she

Beguesse had pas-sed in November of 2009.

testified that Mr.

that ABI

He didn't dispute that Thomson Reuters

had with Mr. Rammell in December of 2008
testimony,

What we're talking about is the lib,rary of

electronic .t:i:!.es..

that • s been working to
We even heard from

the one who really dictated their .relationship

No one's disputing who owns the

ABI cannot sell those files

That 1 s

Given your close rel.ationship with Christa,

maybe you could call April and tell he.r:- 1

quote,

out of

well, there's a great .relationship there and Linda's not

the goodness of her heart she should continue roaking

going to want to go anywhere.

those payments to him.

final say.

Well,

Linda

dt:~esn't

have

The Rutter Group is owned by Thomson

Reuters 1 which is one o! the largest publish corn.panies
in the- world.

She's got basses she has to ans'<Jer to.

She doesntt have final say.

And the fact that Linda's

She. then testifiedt

"And I said I Gan,t do

that and Christa would not want me to do that and she

would probably be rolling ove:t in he:t gnwe right
she knew you were trying to get me involved in thi,-."

45'7
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said that.

Now 1 Linda Diamond was under oath when she

Beguesse Ral'lllt.ell gave that value to Steve Martin in

And this

September of 1999.

several reasons.
Christa.
~er

testimony is sign.i ficanl;. fot

Now,

B:en told her the money W"a.9 owed to

Ken knows he's not owed the money.

in Idaho pal.ls.

to ha.ve April pay out of the goodness of her heart.

says~

Linda

death.

what

gtave :right now if she knew what Ken was up to."

And that was a

off~.red

some additional

He admitted he wasn't involved

And that wa:s their

true assessment of the value of the company ir,. 1999,
$40,000

there could have been a separate oral agreem€!nt between

the same company they turned arot.:.nd and sold to

1

price for

$1,152~000.

He

they tried to explain their way

Now, Mr.

testified that. CBI \-las ttlak.ittg .revetlue.s in the $250, ooo

out of this.

range in 1999 and had been for quite some time; but he

actt.~ally

sti 11 only valued that company at .$ 40,000.

Mr. Rammell

tr~ed

just the book value."

to say, "Well, that was
.And then, if you

re:nember, Mr. Alexander asked Steve Martin

Now, Mr. R;nnrnel.I t:ded to distance himself a
little bit from that $qo,Ooo value he and Christa

questions on cross; and I think they cried to explain
what bock value was.

And, as be

gave to Steve Martin.

Now, they

April; and it 1 s not disputed that this was a purchase

He testified that he could have --

Christa and April that he did not know about.

communication.

otaived that contidential communication in this case; but

That

at the time it was confidential.

testimony in this

Begue sse Rammell

confidentl~l

That was bet'W'een the:m and their attorney.

was the testimony.

in the bttsiness.

that business was worth s t:raight up from thei:r

attorney.

Christa would be rolling ever in her

Now, Ken Rarnmell, he

Sides

or it's really not worth this

"Christa would not have wanted

Christa would not have wanted the

paynents to contint:e- because payments were supposed to
cease

April Beguesse wasn't

'I' here wasn't litigation pending.

weren't posturing to arguer well, itfs really wo:rth this

Ken knolrts he's not owed any money.

me to do that.

let.'s think about the circumstances of

this meeting with Steve Martin.

Ken told

By nbook value" they ;neant: the

cash that was in the bank account.

And

Mr. Alex:ande.r

testi.fied, he didn't just testify that he gave that

tried to get steve Martin to admit that the rRs only

value to Steve Ha.rt.tn; he testified that he and Christa

considers book

v~lUe

in determining what estate tax

27

would need to be paid,

and so that :really it would be

2S

it_

That 1 s April's testimony.

okay to give book value in that type o.f situation

with the explanation Nr.

becau!'.'.e that• s What the IRS looks at,

Mr.

And then Steve

Martin actually got a little animated; and be was like,
"Oh,

no, r.o, na,

'l'hey look up fair market value and

a second.

let • s take Mr

Mr~

Mr. Rammell is an accountant.

Rarmnell

case is not the true medsure of value.

40 years as an accountant.

He

knew what value he was giving at that time.

the business to at that time.

to give the busihes.'3

7hatts why

~

He said they had

to at that time, :::o it

no value.

Now~

heard tl!'stiThony in this

anywhet:e at any ti:me for any purpose.
leave.

There i.s a huge risk there of th.qt happening.

then there would be

let•s take a step back here and think

Rallllllell a.lso testifiet:! t.hat he oaly

consid<?.red two .tac:t.o.rs in considering the price to

charge ABI, what they wanted to get out of the business

about the situation ABI,. April, has testified she's in

and what .April could afford to pay.

She has testified that her customer has told het:

the only two factors ! considered."

that she can't sell those li.brary
the customer say

no~

file~;

she can't do that.

and you heard

She¥!1 testified

that she doesn't own anyLhing because of the claim her

customers made to ownership of those .files and,

a~

TheY could just

That's the only custome:.r of this hu.sine.!ls.

Now, Mr.
died~

~ve

case that the customer 1 the Rutter Group, could go

wasn't worth anything at all.
He said if Christa

Rammell hin:self valued it. qnd

how ABI has valued it and that • .5 JHhat the

business i.'.> worth because we

Mr. Rammell went on to say that they had no

that's the way he tried to explain it.

What the tru6

measul·e of value is is the assets the busi::ess has.

that 1 s

on~

$250,000 a

This case, what the business ea:rn.s in this

Rammell 's background for

That's how they-- Mr.

no

When
#

year.

testified he was an accountant .from the 1950 •.s until he

to give

o! $ 4C, 000

their .business was generating big money.,.

.:t;etired in the mid 90's.

one

that's consistent

Vt~lue

!'l.atnmell and Christa gave that

what the business is actually w-orth ...

Now,

Well,

Rammell'.s trying to giv':!

a

result, it'.s not worth anything .becau.se she can•t sell

He said,

"That's

He also testified if the Rutter Group
chooses to go elsewhere,
anything.

the business wouldn 1 t be worth

He testified that the Rutter Group could

choose to go elsewhere at any time
He testified that

and this was
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significant too.

testified .ABI was still required to

HB

pay even if they lost the customer.

He wants to be paid

damages .in this case.

And it's al14ays an awkward thing

dealing' with this subject,
evidence in this cas<:!,

no matter what.

BUt I

A value is 'What you can sell so1nething for"

UHIDEN'I'IE'lED JUROR:

they or:.ly gave a $40,000 value when the business was

HR. BRUNSON:

to mess around with.

making so much money.

but she doestJ. 1 t

see if I

have

t.ty this fi.rs

that no one disputes .is the value.

at all?

We'!:e talkiny abot<"t

job.

She: had a job.

Think about

What would ABI have if Apr.!..l dies'.:

a time.

She's

How is that?

You guys

All right.

that she paid .$108,000.

the history of payments if you look at Exhibit L

she :manages t:he

that document.

She does the

But Mr.

No

Now,

It's

There are several pages of

Rammell doesn't dispute that.
she also testified what she

lf you look:,

She is operating under risk of losing her only

actually received from CBI, which was some off).ce

puhish her for being .successful.

Now, as a

Yeah?

There "

scenario at

The .first scenario of damages in

it totals up the checks.

Don~t

OM!

some QuickBook entrie:;; and it total:; up the pay;nents,

back in l999.

customer.

Hang on

there • s an Exhibit 1 that was admitted; and you can see

It•s not worth

She makes the improvements.

Let's

Does that help

Is that better?

one disputed in this

anything, just like it. '<U!,sn't worth anything for CBI

customer.

i'hat probably didn't.

All right.

evidence in this case, 11.8! would have ;some old copiers,

work.

Tell me if this helps.

Let me

this case is based on April's testimony about value.

w

Based on the

April has built a business.

trying

:t'w. not a cornpu.:.er expert.

in the back, in the corner?

And l

that fc"t a second

an old copier and some old computers.

t.

No?

think a way t.o think about this is, what would ABI have
if April dies tomorrow?

No,
that's what 1 was

I'll do it really big .. and we'll just go

some old copiers and compute:t:s and things like that.

taking on all the risk of the customer leaving.

Yeah,

can get it a little bic blown up here.

ownership of anythir:.g other than the $.3500 in equipment

But April washYt buying a

few scenarios

Can you o:;uys see. that okay'?

:r-rr. Rarrunell and Christa under-stood this; and that is why

April ha::.: a job,

think based on the

there • .s been a

equipmen.t of $3500; the P<'l.geMaker prog:r:alll, which was
$500; and what I have tel;'meci -- and this i.s my term. --

Plaintiff we get to ask for
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training and customer relationship management.
placed a value, I
on that.

And she

think a significant value, of $250,000

Shers not trying to shortchange this.

net trying to nickel and dime this.

She said,

mother trained me up and she helpe-d me."

she had spent.

She's

"Yes, my

Even though

lifetime working in this industry, even

Q

though she had worked in the business since she was a
teenager,

:she: still placed a

she got f:roru he-r mom.

value of 2.50, 000 on what

She's not -- we're not disputing

That the valUe should be determined as of the date the
asset or the lack of assets 'Jere transferred.

of the tr&n.sition was January 1st¥

And you heard no other expert or no other

The date

That's when

the purchase was completed because that • s when Ani --

tthd it 1 s undisputed in this case -- took over fo:r CB!.

So that's the date you look at.

You don't look at

things that happened a.tter the .fact.
buying a stock.
dayT

well,

1.

mean~

it's like

You buy stock and it tanks the next

that•:!'! too bed.

that you pu:rchased it.

that.

2004.

l3Ut YOU look at the date

The da:te the purchase was

completed was January 1st, 2004.

Now,

she was .:requi:t"ed

witness come into this courtroont al)d say that that's not

to make some payments just to finance it, but the

a

purcha:'le was done on January 1st, 2004,.

rea:soneble number for what she got as far as the

value. things.

training, the mentoring, What she actually -- the stuff

the date

that was in h'er mom's head.

What we got was $254 1 100.

testimony about that,

You heard no other

She was never challenged on that.

Now,

She's the one doing the

work*

That 1 s

the value of \-!he.t we

received~

Who -- she's the best person to o!fer that testimony

because she know.s the business.

and so that's

And on that date the value of

you '11

see anothe.r j ory instruction.

And maybe just rnake a note of this.

It • s' Ins"..:..ruction

Number 39 that deals with ou.t b:reach of warranty claim
Now,

so you add all that up

~nd

add up the 250,

000~

and you get 254,100.

and value and when you should value it.

you get

you add up the Pagel1:aker, you add up the equipment,

you

Okay.

And you take

the payments.
So our claims for !t'a!ld and breach of

contract and breach of warranty, our position is this:

And t.ha t • s

consistent with what. I've ju.st set forth.
So if you take what was -- what we

got and what we t:taid, $70 8, 0 00,

there was some other

payments that were made for o;:ont.r.a.ct labor to Christa
Beguesse

We're not including those..
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'there was another
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40 or SO thousand dollars,

thosE~

but we're not. including

for: purposes of our calculation.

what we got; and you end up with $453,900.

that theory.
$?08, 000.

And you subtract out

And that va.lue is what

Now~

de~ide

theories; and itt s up to you to

Now,

Now,

that 1 s one scenario that you 1 based on the evidence

We

that•~

paid; and

there • s evidence to .support all those
What to do.

I want to touch on anothe.r Jury

you've heard in this case, could determine ABI'.s

instruction.

damages.

claims anti defenses and. things like that bec:austt in this

This is 40.2.

And 40.2,

claims

this talk:; about

but we're a:.:so being

case,

yeah,.. we have

that W-'c::!'Ve talked about is Mr. Rammel! and Christa's

sued,

as you know,

value of the bUsiness before they sold i t to April,

those payments ceased wnen Christa passed pursuant to

Another scenario you've beard in this case

befoxe there was any litigation, before there- WQ.s any
really dispute; and they valued tha.t at $40,000.
was the value the-y gave the business.

!or the remaining _payments because

understanding of the agte!!'ltlent.
An.d,

That

now,

in t.his case t:hey said we waited

too long to file our lawsuit.

And so you can

W~ll,

our position is,

take what we paid for: it and what they sqid to their

you know, that tts soon as we found out that we didn't

attorney in confide-nce, that it was actually worth

own the files,

$668,000.

lznv:suit.
NoW,

a

the thi.td

lot abot<t this when

scer-.~.do

she was being cross-examined by

She

promised.

She doesn't have ownership of them.
And that was

came out. to do this deal.

she just

limitations.

And we went into the statute of

limitations.

aut what I'm getting at here is that we

cont:ract claim and the breach of warranty claim.

lf we

don't have a claim that He can. recover on he-cause

the primary reason she

Because she doesnrt own them 1

she can't turn around and sell them to anybody.

And she

testified about that.
Now,

then the:ce c:ould

still have these :traud claims and this breach of

doesn't have these library of files that she was

does11't own them.

di.~agree,

potentially be a problem with the statute of

-- and April talked

Mr. Alexander -- that she doesn't have these .files.

within months we literally filed a

Ilut if you

waited too longr w-e do have a claim in respo:>se to what
they're suing us

and that 1 s wha. t

for.

There still

ar~

good defenses,

It talks about we. can

40.2 talks about.

offset any damages that they• re trying to get from us;

that -- there's evidence that suppo::t;t.s
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o~n

based on their

this case,

conduct.

So any defenses we have in

.As I

stated at the start o£ my closing

argume-nt, hard work

any claims we have in t.hi,s c11se are atso

de.fe.nses.

p.<.~ys

off.

Don't punish April

for

wori<ing hard.

I appreciate you:.r time; I appreciate your

Now, April testified quite clearly in this
case on mor:e than one occasion that both Christa and :Ken

attention; and on behalf of rn.y

Rammell told her- that: payment!! were to cease upon her

your .service

mother •.s death.
was clear and I

That \Vas

her t.est:.imony and I

in :tno:r e than

think i t

heard it mol:"e than on.ce.

Now~

think i t

one~

client~

we appreciate

Thank you.

RI:BU':t!'AL ARGU.M&N't BY TBZ PLAINTIFF

MR.

and you

BRUNSON~

I want to just touch briefly

on th.:!' verdict form that Mr. Alexander .referred to.

that is a complete

And

de£ense to their clairas in this matter because i ! that

I :meant to do thi.'l as pa;rt of my opening presentation,

was part of the agreement 1

and then 1 got some momem:u.m_ and I

to continue.

then those payments were not

So the only way you can award them

anything is i f you determine that April

sit.t..ing here, was lying to you.

th..at's what you fill. out at the end.

~ay

you

You have to make

the determination .she was lying to you.

It's np to you

to weigh the credibility of the witnesses here.

just referred to it.
asked a

seri~s

Christa.

have been separate deals

between .April and

He testif"ied that he wasn't privy to all their

conversations.

So because he testified that he didn't

talk about it, April disagrees with that.
that Mr.

Raro.mell, in fact,

She testified

did say those things to her

and

And Mr. Alexao.de:r

And the first question

you 1 re

of questions regarding the parties'

claims and how you're going to determine the issues in

the case.
And the first question is,

Hr. Rammell testified that the:re's
separate

'

So as part

of yo1.1r jury instructions you get a verdict form1

under oath,

That's the only

award them a dtme in this case.

forgot.

'TAre the

Plaintiff 1 s claims of fraud bar:red by the statute of
Now, wr.at that is asking is, is did

limitations?''

wait too long to .file the lawsuit.

that is "yes 1

••

that means we can 1 t

If your

to

recover for fraud.

So if you think we 1 re entitled to recover for Iraud,

as v1ell bl:lt thel':e' s other agreements that could have

then you would need to answer ''no>t because it's saying

oc:cur.ted between Chrl.sta and her mother.

our claim --

are the Plaintiff 1 s

claims barred.

460

And so

38

37

You scroll down, you look and see§ ther.e is nothin.g

if yDu say "yes," that means we have no claims.

with thatt I think it•s

So that
there~

s same legalese in the:ce,
ll'IZ~Ybe.

little confusing

so I thought that was

to what wa3 being

listed in this agreement

just-~

tra:nsfer.red .for business or equipment.

a

the important provisions

And that's true with the

ar~nrt

So certainly all

in the agreement,

all

othe.r- -- they go through the other claims and ask the

the important previsions are missing fr<::nn th.;; agreement 1

sane question.

and that.',s why we've heard all this oral testimony abor:t

o! them.

':that's the first question i t asks on all

what the agreement

So that 1 s the only comment I have as to the

You ~ve heard some testimony about honoring

verdict form.

Christa • .'!I 1 egacy.

a. couple o! stateme!'its in the --

There

Waul d you mind

thank you.

THE BAl.LIFE':

{Turning on overhead TV).

MR. BRUNSON:

There was a couple of

statements rna de about the lease agreerr.ent,
And I will be brie£.
have this w.t th you..

Oh.

Thie. itt Exhibit 2,

that~

that t.hat.rs what they•re tryihg to do.

came frc:n Linda Pia.tnond Raznick

were here as well

''All the important provisions are in this agreement.''

to what Ken was trying to do.

You heard the testimony.

Linda was that

You've heard the Judge's
But I'd point out,

the very first word in the document i.s "'lease ...
that

i~

actually not correct.

g::t:ave.

And

The Court has determine-d

So comments about her legacy,

Notv,

11

the only evidence

she would be. rolling ove.t in her

graY~

I

wan!:: to talk to yotl just briefly

about payments ce,asing on death because .April B:eguesse

the evidence came in -- if you see

A, it says nbusiness.

What Christa said to

would be rolling over in her

based on what he 1 s tryi11g to do,

And then if you turn to the end -- and we

here Sxhibi t

Ch.~;ista

in about that. ).s,

that this was a purchase, so --

did this .before

The

and you

abol.lt Christa 1 s legacy and about how Christa would .react

But CoUnsel :made this statement:

i.nstructions as to thi.9 agreemeht.

he ax

You heard Counsel 1 s argument

only testimony that I remember in the trial

2.
yot~'ll

1:\:"ld

you did11' t

The only

testimony about that.
about

E::<hibi t

counsel suggested that that • s what

they 1 re trying to do.

did testify clearly that both Ken and Christa told her

So this was

and she al:s:o .osaid that they told her it was part

that;

suppo3ed to be the business that's bein9 trans.ferred.

of her inheritance.

And Counsel drew your attention to

10
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this Bxhibit .B, which youtll also have.
Your Hoho:r-, may I

REPORTER'S CERTIFICA:l'E

approa.ch?

STATE: OF IDAHo
CAse No.

THE COGRT:

MR. BRITHSON:

I~

Thank you, Your Honor.

don't want to get too much in

yo~r

face,

bt.lt it's kind

But I want you to look on this exhibit.

of hard to

hereby cert.ify:

truth;

And this document directly references

because .she was

at mom's request she was paying .for

her inheritance.

That's directly

consistent with the statement that payments would ceas:e
upon death because she's continuing to honor what her
mom asked her to do.

do that.

But she's not legally required to

She's doing it.

That was the testimony.

I appreciate your time.

There's a lot o.f

things CoUn:3el .:1aid that I could go hack into.
you've heard the evidence,
from us_

your time and energy.

I think

you 1 ve heard the argu:me-nt

Again, on behalf of my client,

Thank you.

(Closing arguments concluded)

That said proceedings were reported by me in

that

Christy, and the reason she•d be paying Ch:;:isty was
becau.s:e this

in thb .Coregoing proceedir.:gs were duly sworn to testify
to the truth, the Vthole truth, and nothing but. the

Rammell told her that thi!! wa!l pa;rt of he.:r

inheritance.

FULLER, Cet"tified Shorthand Repo;r-te:t

Th.at prior to being examined, all witnesses named

Now.- April testified that Christy is her older

sin:t.er; and April also testified that mom and
Nr.

JACK L.

and Notary PubLic in and for the State cf Idaho, do

You •11 see the name "Chdsty" appear here on this
exhibit.

CV-09-2767

COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

Sure-

I appreciate

machine shorthand at the time and place therein na;med

and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me and that the
foregoing transcript contains a verbatim record of said
proceeding:.;.
I furthex certify that I am not related to any of
the parties nor do I

have any interest, financial

otherwise, in the cause of action Of which said
proceedings were a part.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I

have he.reunto set my hand and

affix.ed my seal of office this 1st day of Nay,

---------------Jack L. Fuller, Idaho CSR #762
CSR Expiration Date~
07-10-12
Nota.ry Expiration Date: 04-04-13
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REPORTER'S CERTIfiCATE

STATE OF !DAliO
CASE NO. CV-09-2767
COUN'tt OF 80NNEVlLLE:

l, JACK L. fULLER, Certified Shorthand

ReporL<>~r

and Not.a:ry Public in and for the State of Idaho, do

hereby certify"
Tt:at prior 1:.0 being examined.r all witnesses nemed
in the

for~goi.ng

to the truth,

proceedings were duly sworn to testify

the whole t:::uth,

and nothing but the

truth;:
'That said proceedings wer:e reported by me in

machine shorthand at the time and place therein named
and thereafter
foregoing

reduc~d

tr~.tnscript

to typewriting by me and that the

contains a verbatim record of said

proceedings,

I further certify that I am not related to any of
the partie.s nor do :r have any intereat 1

financial or

otherwise, in the cause of action of which said

proceedings were a part.
IR liiTNESS WHBREOP, 1 have hereunto

affixed ;ny

~et

my hand and

of:; t;u;~:-=-:~

s:~al
of

2012.

Ja
L. Fuller, Idaho CSR 41:7 62
CS Expiration Date!
07-10-12
Notary Expiration Date: 04-04-13
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VILLE COUNT'(, l

Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW TRIAL

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through its counsel of record,
Jeffrey D. Brunson and the firm Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submits the
following memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion for JNOV or new
trial.
INTRODUCTION
On Apri113, 2012, the jury returned its verdict form in this action. The jury found
the defendants Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI), Kenneth Rarnmell (Rammell), and the
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 1

463

Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell (the Estate) (collectively the Defendants) liable for
fraud and breach of contract and warranty and awarded ABI damages in the amount of
$544,013.00. The jury found ABI not liable under any of the counterclaims brought by
the Defendants and awarded the Defendants nothing. As a result, the Defendants filed a
motion for JNOV to dismiss ABI's claims or alternatively for a new trial. The Defendants
have waived many of the arguments they are now asserting. Any remaining arguments
are not supported by the law or facts established in this case. Thus, the Defendants'
motion should be denied.

LEGAL STANDARD
Ajnov should not be granted if the jury's verdict has any basis in the facts of the
case. The Idaho Supreme Court notes that a jnov should only be granted when reasonable
minds could not have reached the verdict that the jury reached. Watson v. Navistar !nt'l
Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 829 P.2d 656 (1992). The moving party admits the tmth of

the adverse evidence and every inference that may be legitimately drawn from it. See,
e.g., Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,496,943 P.2d 912,922 (1997);
Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992); Quick v. Crane, 111

Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). The trial court does not re-weigh the evidence on a
motion for jnov; additionally, the court should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses or
compare any of its own factual findings to those of the jury. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 496,
943 P.2d at 922. The Court draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.Id.
A trial judge possesses discretion when ruling on a motion for a new trial. Quick
v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766,727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). However, the Court should

give full respect to the jury's findings. Jd. at 768, 1196. Exercising its discretion "the

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 2
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trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is
contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear
weight of the evidence .... " Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665,671,429 P.2d 397,403
(1967). Cf Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,97 P.3d 428 (2004). The Defendants carry
the burden of demonstrating to the court that the verdict is not supported by the clear
weight ofthe evidence. See Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107
(1999).
ARGUMENT
I.

The Defendants fail to provide proper support for their motion for JNOV
or for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a).

In framing their arguments for jnov or a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a), the
Defendants rely upon several improper sources. The Defendants cite to April Beguesse's
deposition several times throughout their brief in support of their motion for jnov or a
new trial. However, this deposition, or portions thereof, was never published at trial nor
was the testimony ever admitted into evidence. This is one of the many great failings by
the Defendants. In fact, counsel for the Defendants initially began to publish April's
deposition, but then changed course and withdrew his attempt to publish the deposition.
Because the deposition was never published, it was never added to the trial record in this
case, and the Defendants cannot now use it as evidence to support their motion for jnov
or a new trial. Moreover, even if the deposition is published the testimony is not
inherently admitted during trial because it is not (a) admitted as documentary evidence
that the jury could have taken into the jury deliberation room and (b) not trial testimony.
The Defendants also submitted an affidavit of David Alexander, counsel for the
Defendants, in support of their motion for jnov or a new trial. However, this is an
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 3
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improper use of an affidavit. Mr. Alexander was not a witness or juror at trial. His
affidavit is not the type of affidavit contemplated under I.R.C.P. 59( a), which establishes
the ground for which a new trial can be granted:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any
order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
2. Misconduct of the jury.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justifY the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against the law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new trial based
upon any of the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be
accompanied by an qfjidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in
support ofsuch motion for a new trial. Any motion based on subdivisions
6 or 7 must set fotih the factual grounds therefor with particularity. On a
motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.

IDAHO R. Crv. P. 59( a) (2012) (emphasis added). Mr. Alexander, as counsel for the
Defendants, is not qualified to testifY about any alleged irregularities, jury misconduct,
accident or surprise, or newly discovered evidence at the trial as contemplated by I.R.C.P.
59(a)(7). Furthermore, Mr. Alexander's affidavit consists of vague conclusions and
incorrect statements regarding the trial record, rather than the factual detail required by
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7).
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Finally, the Defendants fail to meet the high standards demanded of a party
moving for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants consistently fail to show that the jury's
verdict had no basis in the facts of the case and that reasonable minds could not have
reached the same verdict reached by the jury in this case. Therefore, and by drawing all
inferences in favor of ABI, the Defendants fail to meet their burden under the jnov
standard. In arguing that a new trial should be granted, the Defendants fail to follow
I.R.C.P. 59(a) by supporting their arguments with either the kind of affidavit
contemplated under the rule or by setting forth the factual grounds of its argument with
particularity. The Defendants also consistently fail to show that the verdict was not
supported by the clear weight of the evidence and that a new trial would be appropriate.
Because the Defendants fail to meet their burden under either the jnov standard or
the standard for granting a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a), the Court should deny the
Defendants' motion for jnov or a new trial.

II.

ABI's claims are Ripe and ABI properly demonstrated damages.
The Defendants cite to case law to support their argument that ABI' s claims are

not right. However, the ripeness cases cited by the Defendants are not implicated here.
The Defendants cite to Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801,53 P.3d 1217, 1220
(2002), for the proposition that there is no real cQJ].troversy until a proposed law becomes
an actual law. Here it is undisputed that a purchase of a business took place. There was a
real and substantial controversy as to what was sold and the value of what was sold.
Thus, the ripeness cases cited by the Defendants do not support a finding in this case that
ABI's claims are not ripe.
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ABI put on evidence of damages as to all of its claims. Most of this evidence
came into the trial record without any objection. It is axiomatic that the failure to object
1

during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection. As a result, ABI's claims are ripe. The
Defendants pin their entire damages argument on the asseliion that ABI failed to prove its
damages. (See Defs.' Mem. Re: JNOV or New Trial at 5-7.) However, ABI presented
testimony at trial regarding the source of ABI' s damages. April testified about the
representations made to her by the Defendants about CBI owning the library of files.
April also testified that she would be unable to sell ABI for the same terms under which
she had purchased CBI. April fuliher testified that she paid $708,000 to the Defendants
for CBI, based on the Defendants' representations to her, when the business was in reality
worth only about $250,000 in 2004. Stephen Martin testified that Rammell and Christa
had valued CBI at $40,000 in their 1999 estate planning documents. The disparity
between the Defendants' representations to April and the actual value of the business, as
set forth in testimony at trial, provide evidence of ABI's damages. Because ABI put on
adequate evidence of damages, the Defendants' ripeness argument fails.
The Defendant's conclusory argument that the jury's award is excessive and
appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice should not even
be considered by the Court. The affidavit submitted by the Defendants is an affidavit of
counsel and is not the type of affidavit contemplated by Rule 59(a). In any regard the
facts are not stated with paliicularity and the Defendants' motion should be denied.
Idaho courts recognize both the "out-of-pocket" rule in measuring damages and
the "benefit ofthe bargain" rule. Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,621,962 P.2d 387, 392

1

It is somewhat perplexing that on one hand the Defendants argue the claims are not ripe and on the other
hand they argue the claims are beyond the statute oflimitations. These are plainly inconsistent positions.
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( 1998). "The underlying principle is that the victim of fraud is entitled to compensation
for every wrong which is the natural and proximate result of the fraud. The measure of
damages which should be adopted under the facts of a case is the one which will effect
such result." Id. The benefit of the bargain rule consists of "the difference between the
real value of the property purchased and the value which it would have had the
representations been true." Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 217, 923
P.2d 456, 462 (1996).
An award of damages will be upheld "where there is sufficient evidence
supporting the award." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200
P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009). Damages need only be proven with reasonable certainty. Id.
"Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude;
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the
realm of speculation." Id. The amount of damages is for the jury to decide. Dinneen v.
Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 624, 603 P.2d 575, 579 (1979). "Ultimately, however, it is for the

trier of fact to fix the amount after determining the credibility of the witnesses, resolving
conflicts in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom." Griffith, 146
Idaho at 618,200 P.3d at 1167. On a motion for jnov, the court can only set aside a jury
award if the damage award "shock[s] the conscience" of the trial judge. Quick v. Crane,
Ill Idaho 759, 769-70, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197-98 (1986).
The Defendants improperly try to impeach the jury verdict. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 606(b) absolutely prohibits substantive impeachment of a jury verdict.
The Idaho appellate courts have consistently upheld the sacrosanct nature of
deliberations and prohibited impeachment of jury verdicts: "A review of the internal
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deliberation process of the jury is prohibited unless affected by extraneous prejudicial
information or an outside influence." Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., 117 Idaho 195,
198,786 P.2d 586,589 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503,510,
757 P.2d 1222, 1229 (Ct. App. 1988)). "The reasons for excluding evidence attempting to
impeach the verdict include insuring the freedom of deliberations, the stability and
finality of verdicts and the protection of jurors." Lehmkuhl, 114 Idaho at 509.
The Defendants have not presented any evidence that any outside prejudicial
force influenced the jury's deliberative process. Thus, any suggestion that the verdict is
anything other than what it purports to be is improper and contrary to Idaho law.
The Defendants' argument that the representations regarding the value of the
proprietary files were statements of opinion and therefore not actionable representations
is without merit. First, the Defendants do not cite any Idaho law in support of their
argument. Second, the cases cited by the Defendants actually support ABI's position.
Third, the argument ignores the representation of ownership of proprietary. Even if the
statement of value was not actionable fraud, the statement of ownership is.
April Beguesse testified at trial that she was told by her mother and Rammell that
she would be getting ownership of a library of files valued between 1-1.3 million dollars
and that she would be getting proprietary software unique to CBI's business that Christa
Beguesse had created. April also testified at trial that she relied on the representations as
to ownership and value. She testified specifically that she relied on Rammell' s
assessment of value because of his background as an accountant. Linda Raznick's
testimony at trial provided via deposition was that Thomson Reuters owned the library of
files and that ABI could not sell or market the library of files to a third party.
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April testified that because she did not own the files, she was deprived of the
benefit of the bargain. April testified that because she did not get proprietary software,
unique to CBI's business that Christa had created, she did not get the benefit of the
bargain. Based on April's testimony at trial, the value of the files at the time of the deal
was represented to be between 1-1.3 million dollars. April testified, without any
objection, that the value of what she actually got was $254,100. Rammell testified that
the value he and Christa gave their estate planning attorney for CBI was $40,000 and that
was because the business was not worth anything without Christa. This evidence
establishes that the jury's finding of damages was well within the permissible range.
April's testimony was not speculative. The Defendants offered no testimony at
trial to rebut her testimony as to damages. As such the jury's verdict should not be
altered and the Defendants' motion should be denied.

III.

The statute of limitations does not bar ABI's claims.
The statute of limitations issue was thoroughly briefed and argued on summary

judgment. ABI incorporates and restates that argument and evidence as if fully set forth
herein. The jury properly determined the statute of limitations issue and the Defendants
are doing nothing more than trying to get the Court to re-weigh factual issues properly
decided by the jury.
In its summary judgment decision, the Court stated "a factual dispute exists" as to
questions of whether ABI's claims were barred by the statute oflimitations. (Nov. 2,
2010 Mem. Decision and Order 7.) This issue was a question of fact and was properly
submitted to the jury.

a. ABI's claims regarding the library of files are not barred by the
statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 9

471

The Defendants argue that ABI' s claims regarding the library of files are barred
by the statute of limitations because April testified that she knew neither CBI nor ABI
owned the copyrights to the library of files. This is the first of several times in their brief
that the Defendants mischaracterize April's testimony regarding ownership of the library
of files. April testified that she knew CBI and ABI did not own the copyright to the final
published books. April testified, however, that she believed CBI and later ABI owned the
library of files used to create and update the printed books. April also testified that her
belief that ABI would own the library of files was significant in her decision to purchase
CBI. April further testified that she did not learn that ABI did not own the library of files
until a phone conversation with Linda Raznick after Christa's death, well within the
statute of limitations.

b. ABI's claims regarding the proprietary software are not barred by
the statute of limitations.
In arguing that ABI' s claims regarding the proprietary software are barred by the
statute oflimitations, the Defendants improperly cite to April Beguesse's earlier
deposition. As argued above, counsel for the Defendants failed to publish the deposition
at trial, so it is not a part of the record and cannot be relied upon by the Defendants in
their motion for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants failed to elicit the same or
substantially similar testimony from April during trial. The Defendants simply failed to
properly use April's deposition during trial and cannot now rely upon the deposition to
support their motions.
Furthermore, in making this argument, the Defendants again miscast April's
testimony. Contrary to what the Defendants argue, April testified that she heard Christa
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address members of the Exchange Club and state that she had invented a software
operating program. The fact that April did not hear Christa's later clarification of this
statement was supported by Stephen Hall's testimony. This evidence indicates that April
only became aware of the Defendants' fraud within the time period established by the
statute of limitations.
The Defendants' argument that ABI' s breach of contract and warranty claims
against the Defendants accrued upon ABI' s purchase of CBI in 2004 also must fail. The
jury correctly determined that the Defendants were equitably estopped from arguing that
ABI's breach claims accrued in 2004 because of the Defendants' fraudulent
representations. The jury correctly and properly determined that ABI' s breach claims
against the Defendants were not barred by the statute of limitations.

c. None of ABI' s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
In arguing that all of ABI's other claims against the Defendants should be barred
under the statute of limitations, the Defendants rely on their conclusory statement that
"[t]here simply is no substantial and competent evidence to rule otherwise." (Defs.'

"~ ·~ Mem. Re: JNOV or New:f'ri~fat 10.) This is not enough. The Defendants
have a high
....
burden to meet in order to successfully move for jnov or for a new trial, and they fail to
meet their burden under either standard. In drawing all inferences in favor of ABI, as the
Court must do on a motion for jnov, it is clear the Defendants have failed to show that the
jury's verdict has no basis in the facts of the case. The Defendants have also failed to
show that the evidence did not support the jury's determination that none of ABI's claims
were barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, a new trial would not be appropriate
under I.R.C.P. 59( a).

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page '11

473

IV.

Counsel for ABI did not make inappropriate arguments during closing
statements to the jury.
The Defendants next argue that counsel for ABI made inappropriate closing

arguments. The Defendants claim ABI' s counsel did this by focusing on matters
previously rejected by the Court, making arguments not based on evidence presented at
trial, and inflaming the jury by arguing irrelevant matters. However, the Defendants have
waived their right to make such an argument. Furthermore, counsel for ABI did not act
inappropriately in delivering his closing argument to the jury.
By failing to make a proper objection to ABI's counsel's closing argument at trial,
the Defendants have waived their right to make any objection. The Idaho Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., in which
the Court found that the district court erred in granting a new trial based in part on
statements made by counsel in closing argument:
The district court likewise erred in finding counsel's statements at trial
caused an irregularity in the proceedings that unfairly prejudiced the jury
against Newby-Wiggins. This Court has held that where counsel fails to
make a proper objection to evidence or testimony offered at trial the issue
is not preserved for appeal. See, Wheaton v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund,
129 Idaho 538, 541, 928 P.2d 42, 45 (1996). Gillingham's counsel
remarked in closing that should the jury find the State was required to
indemnify Newby-Wiggins for Gillingham's claim, the result would be
that Gillingham will recover nothing. Counsel's statement was an
inaccurate portrayal of Gillingham's recovery, but Newby-Wiggins failed
to object to the statement during trial. The district court ignored NewbyWiggins' waiver of objection and instead granted a new trial. This was
improper and an insufficient ground to grant a new trial.
142 Idaho 15,24-25, 121 P.3d 946, 955-56 (2005). Because counsel in the Gillingham
case failed to object to opposing counsel's inaccurate remarks during the trial, it waived
any objections. Just as in Gillingham, counsel for the Defendants failed to object to
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anything said by ABI's counsel during closing argument, and by failing to do so waived
all objections to anything said during ABI's counsel's closing argument.
Furthermore, nothing said by ABI's counsel during closing argument was
inappropriate. The Defendants first accuse ABI' s counsel of focusing on matters
previously rejected by the Court, specifically that Rammell only contributed $500 to
become a fifty percent member of CBI, that the jury should find fraud concerning the
will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group. ABI's
counsel did not inappropriately allude to any of these issues in his closing statement.
Evidence that Rammell only contributed $500 to become a fifty percent member
of CBI came into the record during Rammell' s testimony at trial, and goes to the
materiality of ABI's claims against the Defendants. In addition, ABI's counsel never
suggested in his closing argument that the jury should find fraud regarding the will.
Rather, ABI's counsel instead focused on representations made by the Defendants to
April that her monthly payments should cease upon Christa's death. Finally, and contrary
to the Defendants' arguments, counsel for ABI never suggested that April had the right to
a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group. This was simply not mentioned during his
closing argument.
The Defendants also argue that counsel for ABI improperly argued in closing that
they defrauded ABI because it would be worth nothing if April died. This is, however, a
logical extension of earlier testimony given by RammelL Rammell testified that when he
and Christa were valuing their assets for estate planning purposes, CBI was estimated to
be worth $40,000, because if Christa died, that was the amount of assets that could be
liquidated from the business. Rarnmell testified that when he and Christa were engaging
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in this valuation analysis for estate planning reasons, they determined the business
wouldn't be worth anything if Christa died. Regardless, there was no objection to any
statements concerning these arguments.
With this testimony from Rammell in the record, and other evidence being what it
is, it only makes sense that ABI, like CBI before it, would lose its value upon the death of
its owner, April. This argument pertains to the issue of valuation, and counsel for ABI did
not inappropriately bring it up in his closing argument to the jury.
Finally, the Defendants make a conclusory statement that counsel for ABI
inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters in his closing argument, which tainted
every claim before the jury and urged them to find fraud without any basis in the
evidence or in the law, and instead agree on a verdict based on passion and prejudice. The
Defendants offer absolutely no evidence to support this claim. Instead, the circumstances
suggest that the jury's verdict was based on the evidence of the trial.

V.

The Court should uphold the jury's verdict as to ABI's fraud claims
against all Defendants.
a. The jury verdict form was proper.
The Defendants argue that the jury verdict form was improper because it is

impossible to determine what specific acts of fraud the jury determined were committed
by the Defendants. However, the Defendants effectively waived their ability to make this
argument upon submission of their proposed jury verdict form. Furthermore, the jury
verdict form was proper in this case.
On September 9, 2011, the Defendants submitted their proposed special verdict
form. Several of the questions on the verdict form are substantially identical to the verdict
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form utilized by the jury. Examples of similar or identical questions include the
following:
Did the Defendants commit fraud? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and
Special Verdict Form, Question 1.)
Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 2.)
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 3.)
Did Christa Beguesse commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 4.)
Did the plaintiff know or should it reasonably have known, on or before
May 7, 2005, that it could not sell the library of files without its
customer's permission? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form, Question 3.)
Are Plaintiffs claims of fraud barred by the statute of limitations?
(Verdict Form, Question 1.)
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the
library of proprietary files? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form, Question 4.)
Did the defendants breach a warranty with plaintiff ABI relating to the
library of proprietary files? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form, Question 5.)
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with
Plaintiff as to a library of files? (Verdict Form, Question 7.)
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the
proprietary software? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form, Question 7.)
Did the defendants breach a warranty with plaintiff ABI relating to the
proprietary software? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form, Question 8.)
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with
Plaintiff as to proprietary software? (Verdict Form, Question 10.)
By submitting a proposed jury verdict form that is substantially similar to the
verdict form utilized by the jury in reaching its verdict, the Defendants have waived any
objections to the verdict form.
Furthermore, the jury verdict form is proper. With regards to ABI' s fraud claims
against the Defendants, it asks whether each defendant individually committed fraud
against ABI. This is more specific than the Defendants' proposed special verdict form
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 15
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regarding whether the Defendants committed fraud against ABI. The jury verdict form is
more specific than the Defendants make it out to be, and it sufficiently and properly
outlined the questions for the jury to answer in delivering its verdict. The Court should
uphold the jury's verdict on all of ABI's fraud claims against the defendant.

b. The jury instructions were proper.
The Defendants also argue that the jury instructions were improper because "[t]he
jury was allowed to consider fraud on the basis of 'misrepresentations as to the terms of
the contract.'" (Defs.' Mem. Re: JNOV or New Trial at 11-12.) The Defendants then
make a confusing argument that a party cannot misrepresent terms while negotiating a
contract. In stating that the Court erred in giving the jury a blanket and confusing fraud
instruction, the Defendants do not point out that they failed to submit a proposed jury
instruction that would fix the alleged failings in the instruction given by the Court to the
jury. The Defendants effectively waived their ability to argue that the jury instruction
pertaining to fraud was improper by failing to submit a better alternative in their proposed
jury instructions. Additionally, the Defendants offer no evidence to show that the jury's
instruction on fraud was improper.

c. The evidence supports the amount of damages awarded by the
jury.
The Defendants argue that the amount of damages awarded by the jury are not
supported by the evidence, and that the jury improperly based its damages award on
ABI's fraud claims related to Christa Beguesse's will. However, in making this
argument, the Defendants use blatantly incorrect reasoning.
The Defendants claim that the jury improperly awarded ABI damages for fraud
based on Christa's will, and that the award was merely a retrial of the probate issue. In
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 16
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arguing this, the Defendants state that "the amount awarded [by the jury for ABI's fraud
claims] is exactly one-half of the value of the community property as it appears in the
notes of attorney Stephen Martin." (Defs.' Mem. In Supp. Defs.' Mot. JNOV or New
Trial12.) This is incorrect. Mr. Martin's notes plainly showed that the value of the
community property, as estimated by Christa Beguesse and Rammell in 1999, was
$900,000.00. (See Pl.'s Trial Ex. 44.) The jury awarded ABI $354,000.00 in damages for
ABI's fraud claims against the Defendants. Contrary to what the Defendants argue,
$354,000.00 is not half of the $900,000.00 valuation of the community in 1999, and there
is no indication that the jury based its fraud award on the issue of Christa Beguesse's
will.
The Defendants ignore the fact that the jury spent several hours deliberating the
case's merits. The Defendants' arguments are based solely on supposition. Simply
arguing that the jury must have awarded damages based on passion or prejudice because
the verdict was large is insufficient. This is a commercial claim, which by its very nature

involves significant dollar amounts. There must be some evidence that passion or
prejudice was involved in this case. The Defendants have no such evidence.
In arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the amount of damages
awarded by the jury, the Defendants have failed to meet their burden under either the
jnov standard or the standard for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a). In drawing every
inference in favor of ABI, as the Court must do on a motion for jnov, the Defendants
have failed to show that reasonable minds could not have arrived at the verdict and award
reached by the jury. The Defendants have also failed to show that the jmy's verdict was
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not supported by a clear weight of the evidence, as required for a motion for new trial
under I.R.C.P. 59(a).

VI.

ABI did not fail to prove all the essential elements of fraud.
The Defendants later argue that ABI failed to prove all the essential elements of

fraud, specifically that CBI owned a library of proprietary titles valued at over
$1,000,000; that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business;
and that Christa had a will that allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon
Christa's death. In making this argument, the Defendants fail to provide evidence to
support its argument while ignoring testimony in the record that contradicts its position.

a. Representations regarding ownership of the library of files.
The Defendants' argument is based on its mischaracterization of April Beguesse's
testimony regarding representations made to her by the Defendants concerning ownership
of the library of files. As established above, April testified at trial that she knew CBI and
ABI did not own the copyright to the physical books produced by the Rutter Company,
but she testified repeatedly that she believed she owned the library of files used to create
and update the finished product. April's belief was supported by her testimony that CBI,
and later ABI, provided locked versions of the files to the Rutter Group, requiring any
edits or changes to be made by CBI or ABI. This testimony provided evidence that April
Beguesse and ABI were in fact ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' representations
about CBI' s ownership of the library of files.

It should be noted that April's testimony about her belief regarding the ownership
of files is undisputed. The Defendants disclosed Pete Masterson as a potential expert
witness to rebut April's testimony about ownership of the files, but declined to call him at

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 18

480

trial. Therefore, April's testimony about ownership of the library of files remains
undisputed.

b. Representations regarding the proprietary software.
In arguing that ABI failed to show it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants'
representations to April that CBI owned proprietary software, the Defendants ignore
evidence from April's testimony indicating otherwise. April testified that Christa told her
that she would be getting software, including proprietary software, as part of her purchase
of CBI. April further testified that she heard Christa tell members at a meeting of the
Exchange Club that Christa had invented a software operating program. April also
testified that Rammell concurred with Christa's representations about the proprietary
software, and that she relied on these representations by Christa and Rammell. April's
testimony provides evidence that she and ABI were ignorant of the falsity of the
Defendants' representations regarding the proprietary software.

c. Representations regarding ABI's payments to cease upon the
death of Christa.
The Defendants argue that ABI failed to prove all the essential elements of fraud
in its attempts to relitigate the issues stemming from Christa's will and decided earlier by
the probate court. This is a misstatement of ABI' s position- ABI argued that the
Defendants represented to April that ABI' s payments for the purchase of CBI would
cease upon Christa's death. The terms of the will are irrelevant to this argument; instead,
what is relevant are the representations made by the Defendants to April about ABI's
monthly payments stopping after Christa's death as a pari of ABI's deal to purchase CBI.
Furthermore, counsel for ABI never urged the jury to rewrite Christa's will

in claiming
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this, the Defendants merely rely on a conclusory statement without any evidence to
support it.
In arguing that ABI failed to prove all of the essential elements of fraud, the
Defendants fail to provide evidence to meet their high burden under the standards for
granting a motion for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants have failed to demonstrate that
reasonable minds could not have reached the same verdict as that reached by the jury,
making the Defendants' motion for jnov inappropriate. The Defendants have also failed
to show that the jury's verdict was not supported by the clear weight of the evidence,
making the Defendants' motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a) inappropriate.

VII.

The Court should uphold the jury's verdict as to ABI's fraud claims
against the Estate.
The Defendants also argue that ABI 's fraud claims against the Estate must fail for

a lack of substantial and competent evidence. In making this argument, the Defendants
ignore several pieces of testimony that came from different sources throughout the course
of the trial that supported ABI's claims of fraud against the Estate.
April testified during direct examination that Christa and Rarnrnell told her that
she would be getting the turnkey business, software, and a library of files worth 1-1.3
million dollars, which could later fund April's retirement. This testimony came in prior to
counsel for the Defendants raising an objection under Idaho Code§ 9-202 and Idaho Rule
of Evidence 601 (b), and before the Court issued its limiting instruction to the jurors.
Therefore, April's above testimony about representations made in part by Christa about
the elements of April's purchase of CBI provides substantial and competent evidence of
fraud on the part ofthe Estate.
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Later in the trial proceedings, counsel for the Defendants opened the door for
April to testifY about further representations made by her mother regarding April's
purchase of CBI. Under cross-examination by counsel for the Defendants, April testified
that Christa told her the business would belong to April one hundred percent and that
payments would cease upon Christa's death. This testimony provided further substantial
and competent evidence supporting ABI's claims of fraud against the Estate.
Stephen Hall provided further evidence of fraud by the Estate against ABI. Mr.
Hall testified that he attended the meeting in which Christa addressed the Exchange
Group. Mr. Hall further testified that he thought Christa said she developed a software
program or process related to her line of work. He further testified that he thought he
approached Christa after the presentation and learned that she used off-the-shelf software,
but that April, who was present at the general presentation, may not have heard Christa's
answer to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall's testimony provided additional evidence supporting ABI's
claim of fraud against the Estate.
Finally, Rammell's testimony provided even more evidence supporting ABI's
claims of fraud against the Estate. Rammell testified that he and Christa both told April
that she would be able to sell ABI for the same amount that she paid to Christa and Ken
for the purchase of CBI. The Defendants argue that any representations made by
Rammell and Christa to April regarding the valuation of CBI were merely statements of
opinion rather than statements of fact. In making this argument, the Defendants cite to
three cases, none of which are Idaho cases. However, should the Court choose to consider
them, these cases actually support ABI's claims against the Estate by distinguishing that
false statements by a person with special knowledge of a matter may be actionable:
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Whenever property of any kind depends for its value upon contingencies
which may never occur, or developments which may never be made,
opinion as to its value must necessarily be more or less of a speculative
character; and no action will lie for its expression, however fallacious it
may prove, or whatever the injury a reliance upon it may produce ...
For opinions upon matters capable of accurate estimation by
application of mathematical rules or scientific principles, such, for
example, as the capacity of boilers, or the strength of materials, the case
may be different. So, also, for opinions of parties possessing special
learning or knowledge upon the subjects in respect to which their opinions
are given, as of a mechanic upon the working of a machine he has seen in
use, or of a lawyer upon the title of property which he has examined.
Opinions upon such matters are capable of approximating the truth, and
for a false statement of them, where deception is designed, and injury has
followed from reliance on them, an action may lie.

Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 558 (1882).
A statement as to value of property may also be actionable as a fraudulent
representation of fact under some circumstances, where there is a special
reliance placed upon it and superior knowledge on the part of the maker.
In such a case it may also be said that the statement of value when the
value is known to be different from that stated is a fraudulent
misrepresentation of an opinion as existing that does not exist.

Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1924).
While these cases are not binding in Idaho, they offer persuasive authority to
support ABI's claims for fraud against the Estate. Given Christa's extensive experience
in the typesetting field- a fact that was testified by several witnesses -she had superior
knowledge about CBI and typesetting, and any representations made by her as to the
value of CBI should be held to a higher standard. Ultimately, Rammell' s testimony,
combined with the testimonies of April Beguesse and Stephen Hall, provide substantial
and compelling evidence to support ABI's fraud claims against the Estate.
VIII.

The Court should uphold ABI's fraud and breach claims against all
Defendants regarding the library of files.
a. ABI did not pursue a claim of guaranteed contract at trial.
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The Defendants argue that ABI improperly argued a guaranteed contract claim at
trial under the guise of ABI' s claims for fraud and breach of contract and warranty
against the Defendants. However, in making this argument, the Defendants again
improperly cite April's unpublished deposition, which is not in the trial record.
Additionally, in claiming that ABI merely reargued its earlier guaranteed contract
claim that was dismissed by this Court in its summary judgment decision, the Defendants
ignore the fact that the evidence in question goes to the materiality of the representations
made by the Defendants to April regarding her purchase ofCBI and the library of files.
Even the evidence from April's unpublished deposition relied on by the Defendants goes
to the materiality ofthe Defendants' representations to April.
In making their argument, the Defendants are overstating the significance of the
Court's summary judgment decision regarding ABI' s guaranteed contract claim. In its
decision, the Court ruled simply that the alleged facts did not support a claim for a
guaranteed contract between ABI and the Rutter Group. (Nov. 2, 2010 Mem. Decision
and Order 10 ("Thus, the record established that ABI can not prove its ignorance of the
falsity of the alleged statement regarding a guaranteed contract with Rutter. Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment dismissing ABI's claim for fraud as it relates to this
alleged misrepresentation.")) The Court's decision regarding ABI's guaranteed contract
claim was limited to that particular claim and did not limit ABI' s ability to present
evidence as to the materiality of the Defendants' representations regarding ownership.
Finally, contrary to what the Defendants argue, there is no "law of this case" until
the case is concluded. The Defendants' conclusory statement that "[h]aving heard the
evidence, judgment for the Defendant is warranted on the law of this case, which is that
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Plaintiff was aware at the time she entered the contract that she would have no ability to
control her customer's typesetting choices" is both misleading and confusing. (Defs.'
Mem. Re: JNOV or New Triall9.) ABI was not trying to pursue its earlier claim of a
guaranteed contract under different terms, and the evidence referenced by the Defendants
in attempting that argument instead goes to show the materiality of the defendant's
representations to April Beguesse regarding ownership ofthe library of files.

b. ABI established a legal basis for its claims of fraud and breach
against the Defendants regarding the library of files.
The Defendants next launch into a confusing litany about ownership rights and
copyright law. In making their argument that ABI failed to establish a legal basis for its
claims of fraud and breach of contract and warranty, the Defendants mischaracterize
exactly what constituted ownership of the files as discussed between April Beguesse and
the Defendants. In so doing, the Defendants also fail to provide any evidence or authority
for their argument that ABI had no legal right in the files.
The question of ownership of the library of files is a fact question, and was
appropriate for the jury to consider. April testified repeatedly throughout the trial that she
thought she owned the library of files, and that this ownership belief was significant to
her. April testified that she thought she owned the files and was free to sell them until her
conversation with Linda Raznick, during which April learned she did not own the files.
April further testified that she would not have agreed to the deal had she known that CBI
did not own the library of files.
The Defendants again mischaracterize April's testimony about ownership of the
library of files. April testified throughout the trial that she did not believe CBI had
ownership of the finished publications- CBI did not own the physical books. April
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 24

testified instead that the Defendants represented to her that CBI owned the files used to
create the Rutter Group's finished publications. April testified several times that CBI, and
later ABI, would send locked versions of the files to the Rutter Group for its review.
April explained in her testimony that the locked version meant that the Rutter Group
could not manipulate the file, and any changes or updates had to be made by CBI and
later ABI. April's testimony in this regard is undisputed.
This evidence indicates that contrary to what the Defendants argue, ABI had an
exclusive version of the files and April reasonably believed she owned the files and that
if the Rutter Group severed ties with ABI, it would have to pay ABI for the files. This
evidence provides substantial support for the jury's determination on ABI's claims for
fraud and breach of contract and warranty on the question of the library of files. In
arguing otherwise, the Defendants ignore the evidence presented at trial.

IX.

The Court should uphold ABI's breach of contract and warranty claim
against the Defendants.
The Defendants next argue that April's testimony at trial regarding the terms of

the contract was vague and irrational. In making this argument, the Defendants don't cite
to any evidence or testimony in the record supporting this claim. An examination of
April's testimony contradicts the Defendants' charges that it was vague and irrational.
April testified consistently during both direct and cross-examination about the
terms of the agreement between ABI and the Defendants. April testified that Christa told
her that the business would belong completely to April. April testified that Christa and
Rammell told her that no one would be able to take the business away from her. April
also testified that she believed that under the contract, she was paying for the library of
files, income from the business, and the ability to sell the files later. April testified that
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page )5
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she would not have agreed to the deal had she known that CBI didn't own the library of
files, and that instead ABI would be paying for Christa's mentoring, obsolete computers,
furniture, and PageMaker. This extensive testimony from April is neither vague nor
irrational, and it shows that the jury's verdict in favor of ABI was not against the clear
weight of the evidence at trial.
The Defendants also cite to the Court's summary judgment decision to argue that
ABI is precluded from recovery for both its fraud and breach claims against the
Defendants. However, in doing so, the Defendants completely misapply the Court's
language in the decision, which addresses the Defendants' counterclaims:
8. Defendants' Counterclaims
Defendants also seek summary judgment on their counterclaims seeking
relief for breach of contract, constructive trust, and injunctive relief.
Defendants' argument is primarily based on the claim that Plaintiff has
breached the contract by failing to pay $12,000 a month pursuant to the
agreement.
While the evidence established that Plaintiff has stopped making
the monthly payment, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the
non-payment is a breach of contract. If Plaintiff is successful on the fraud
claim, the contract may be considered void and there would be no breach.
(Nov. 2, 2010 Mem. Decision and Order 21 (emphasis added).)
This language by the Court clearly pertains to the Defendants' counterclaims.
However, the Defendants are attempting to flip the language around to apply it to ABI' s
claims of fraud and breach against the Defendants. This argument misrepresents the
Court's language in its summary judgment decision, and the Defendants fail to offer any
reason why ABI should be precluded from recovery under both its fraud and breach
claims.
The Defendants again argue that the jury verdict form was improper and warrant
an order granting their motion for jnov or a new trial. However, for the reasons argued
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page Z.6
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above, the Defendants have waived any objections by submitting their proposed special
verdict form, which is substantially similar to the verdict form utilized by the jury.
Additionally, contrary to the Defendants' argument, Question 8 of the jury verdict form
does not fail to specifY whether the jury's determination of breach was related to the
library of files or to a term of the agreement. Question 8, which asks the total amount of
damages owed to ABI from the Defendants' breach, refers back to Questions 6 and 7 both of which address ABI' s claims regarding the library of files. (Verdict Form,
Question 8.) With that context, Question 8 clearly contemplates ABI's damages
stemming from its breach claim related to the ownership of the files. The Defendants fail
to provide any evidence to support its claim that the jury could have awarded damages
based on a different breach by CBI, because there is no evidence to support this
argument.
The Defendants conclude by rehashing their earlier argument that the damages
awarded by the jury, in this case for ABI's breach of contract and warranty claims against
the Defendants, were not supported by the evidence. Again, the Defendants fail to
provide any evidence for this argument. In contrast, the evidence at trial shows that ABI
presented a range of potential damages valuations, and the jury's award is well within
this range. And again, the Defendants' argument that the jury must have awarded
damages based on passion or prejudice rather than on the evidence, merely because the
verdict was large, is insufficient. In this area, as with their overall arguments throughout
their brief, the Defendants fail to meet their burden to justifY this Court granting their
motion for jnov or a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a).
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CONCLUSION

As a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for jnov and a new trial
should be denied.

Jeffr
John . Avondet
OfBeard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUE SSE, INC. , an Idaho )
corporation,
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-09-2767

)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual)
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of
)
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by
)
its qualified personal
)
Representative, Kenneth
)
Rammell,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

On the 5th day of June, 2012, Plaintiff's motion for
attorney fees and costs and Defendants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial came before the
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, by telephonic
connection in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the
Plaintiff.
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel table.
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial.
presented argument in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Brunson
Mr. Brunson
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presented Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs.
Alexander presented rebuttal argument and argument

Mr.

opposition

to Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs.
The Court will take the matter(s) under advisement and issue
a decision as soon as possible.
Court was thus adjourned.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5!1J__ day

I hereby certify that on the
caused a true and correct copy
be delivered to the following:

of June, 2012, I
the foregoing document to

RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495

W. Marcus W. Nye
David E. Alexander
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

491 B

11

"~"\os-359-ssss

03·36:55 p.m.

06-12-2012

2 /3

6·2-S

uj:,!

r·!.AGIST;::
EvN;iEVILLE

12 JUN 12 PH 4: 35
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208)523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEvaLECOUNTYIDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rarnmell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, TI1e
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

PLAINTIFF'S ACCEPTANCE OF
COURT'S REMJTTITUR

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through its counsel of record,
Jeffrey D. Brunson and the firm Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully accepts the
Court's remittitur outlined in its Order on Motion JNOV or Nevv Trial filed June 11, 2012
and further clarified in its Supplemental Order on Motion For New Trial filed June 12,
2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Case No. CV-09-2767
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR JNOV OR
NEW TRIAL

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendants/Counterclaimant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial.
I. PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc., (ABI) brought this action seeking to recover for
fraud and breach of contract in the purchase of a business from Defendant Christa
Beguesse, Inc., (CBI). CBI counterclaimed for breach of contract in failing to make
payments pursuant to the purchase agreement. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a
verdict finding that CBI breached its contract and that Defendants committed fraud. The
jury further denied CBI recovery on its counterclaim.
I.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION
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In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the law
provides that "a jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of
the jury." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276, 287
(2008) (citing Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 20,
121 P.3d 946, 951 (2005)). In making the motion, a defendant admits the truth of all of
the plaintiffs' evidence and every legitimate inference. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho
249,252-53, 678 P.2d 41,44-45 (1984).
Whether that evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact is for the court to
determine.

Furthermore the question is not whether there is literally no evidence

supporting the jury verdict, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury
could properly find a verdict for that party. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,
736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974).

Accordingly, the trial judge does not weigh the

evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses and make his own separate findings of
fact and compare them to the jury's findings as he would in deciding on a motion for a
new trial. Quick v. Crane 111 Idaho 759, 763-764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 - 1192 (1986).
With regard to a motion for new trial, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( a) states
that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues in an action for ..." (1) irregularity in the proceedings/abuse of discretion, (5)
excessive damages, (6) Insufficiency ofthe evidence/against the law, and (7) error in the
law.
In considering an allegation of excessive damages, the trial court is to weigh the
evidence and then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had there been
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no jury. If the trial judge discovers that his determination of damages is so substantially
different from that of the jury that he can only explain this difference as resulting from
some unfair behavior such as "passion or prejudice," then the court should grant a new
trial. The disparity in damages should "shock the conscience" of the trial judge or lead
him to conclude that it would be "unconscionable" to let the damage award stand as the
jury set it. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725 (Mont.l984); Mamma v. State,
138 Ariz. 528,675 P.2d 1347 (1983). Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187
(1986).
A motion based upon subdivision 6 must "set forth the factual grounds therefore
with particularity." I.R.C.P. 59(a).
A trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where
"after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of
the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes the verdict is not in accord
with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." The trial court is
given broad discretion in this ruling. The trial judge may set aside the
verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it. In addition,
the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict-winner. Addressing the considerable discretion
given to the trial court in deciding motions for new trials, this Court has
said:
"[t]he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the
verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is
convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by
vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or
justice."
Furthermore, "[i]f having given full respect to the jury's findings, the
judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a
new trial."
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428,435 (2004)
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After a trial court assesses the credibility of the witnesses and weighs the
evidence, the court may grant a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence if
the court determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence and that a
different result would follow a retrial. Hudelson v. Delta Jnt'l Mach Corp., 142 Idaho
244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005); O'Shea v. High Mark Development, LLC 2012 WL
1436898, 13 (Idaho,2012).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Motion for JNOV.
Defendants ask the court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict
dismissing ABI's claim.

Defendants argue that the verdict is unsupported by the

evidence and contrary to law. First, the Court finds that there was no error in the
application of the law to the claims made.

Second, the Court finds that there was

sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict with the exception of the claim against the
Estate of Christa Beguesse.
In its verdict, the jury determined that ABI was entitled to recover against the
Estate by reason of fraud. However, pursuant to Rule 601, IRE, the jury was instructed
that the testimony of April Beguesse could not be considered as evidence supporting a
claim against the Estate. Jury Instruction No. 21. Absent the testimony of April, there is
no testimony or evidence of any statement made by Christa to April which would satisfy
the elements of fraud.
Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support a fraud claim against the
Estate, and that claim should be dismissed. The remainder of Defendants' motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied.
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B. Motion for New Trial.
Defendants based their motion for new trial on Rule 59(a), subdivisions (1)
irregularity in the proceedings and/or abuse of discretion, (5) excessive damages, (6)
Insufficiency of the evidence and/or the verdict being against the law, and (7) error in the
law. In considering the evidence and course of trial, the Court finds that there was no
irregularity in the proceedings or error in the law entitling Defendants to a new trial. 1
As to allegedly excessive damages, the amount of damages this Court would have
awarded does vary from the damages awarded by the jury. April testified that ABI paid
$708,000 to CBI yet she thought that the business was only worth $254,100 when
considering the fraud and breach of contract. The measure of damages would then be
$453,900. It is the Court's opinion that this testimony by April set out the maximum
amount of recovery available to ABI. As such, the Court finds the jury award of damages
in excess of that amount to be inexplicable and based on passion and prejudice.
There was testimony that for purposes of estate planning some years prior to the
sale of the business to ABI, Christa and/or Rammell advised the estate planning attorney
that the value of the business was $40,000. It is the Court's opinion that reliance upon
the $40,000 figure would not be reasonable, but rather would be against the clear weight
of the evidence and particularly April's own testimony. As such, the Court finds that the
ends of justice would be served by granting a conditional new trial.
Specifically, Rule 59.1, IRCP allows for a new trial conditioned upon the
acceptance of a remittitur.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants would be

1

There is no basis for the Estate to seek a new trial inasmuch as the claim against the Estate will be
dismissed pursuant to the Estate's motion for jnov.
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entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages unless Plaintiff accepts a remittitur in the
amount of$90,113, resulting in ajudgment of$453,900.
In considering the evidence presented at trial, the Court is of the opinion that the
evidence would have supported a finding in favor of ABI or Defendants, depending on
whom the jury believed. Again, the credibility of witnesses was a critical factor. The
jury's determinations finding liability against CBI and Rammell in favor of ABI are
supported by substantial evidence and are not against the clear weight of the evidence.
The Court does not believe a new trial on these issues would result in a different
outcome. As such, Defendants are not entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is granted in part and denied in part, as set out above. Defendant's motion for
new trial is granted in part and denied in part, as set out above. Plaintiff shall have 42
days from the entry of this order to accept a remittitur.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this _I{_ day of June, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Case No. CV-09-2767
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendants/Counterclaimant.

In its Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, this Court conditionally granted a
new trial on the issue of damages subject to Plaintiff accepting a remittitur in the amount
$90,113. For purposes of clarification, the remittitur only applies to the damages assessed
against CBI. For example, if Plaintiff accepted the remittitur, total damages assessed
against Rammell would remain at $354,000, while the total damages assessed against
CBI would be reduced to $453,900.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

ILday of June, 2012.
\

"'-'-'-""_,"'-'E. TINGEY
DISTRICT JUDGE
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postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox.
Jeffrey D. Brunson
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
David E. Alexander
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
By )11~
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ll-.J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Case No. CV -09-2767
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

vs.
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendants/Counterclaimant.

This matter has come before the Court upon Plaintiff's motion for costs and
attorney fees. Defendants have objected to the motion.

ANALYSIS
Defendants seek an award of costs pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P. and an award of
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3). Section 12-120(3) allows for an award of
attorney fees in actions "to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction ... ".
While Plaintiff may have requested attorney fees pursuant to the contract between
the Parties for purchase of the business, there is no evidence that the oral purchase
contract contained an attorney fee provision.
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In considering a motion for costs and fees, the Court is granted broad discretion in
determining a prevailing party. Rule 54(d)(l)(B) provides as follows:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
1. COSTS

The Court has considered the claims made in this matter, the progress of the
litigation, and the ultimate outcome. The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party
as against Defendants Kenneth Rammell and Chirista Beguesse, Inc. Based on the
record, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right
(Rule 54( d)(l )(C)) in the amount of $2,409.29, as against said Defendants, jointly and
severally.

2. ATTORNEY FEES
Under§ 12-120(3), attorney fees are recoverable when the action arises from a
contract or commercial transaction.
A "commercial transaction" is defined in Section 12-120(3) as "all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Id. An
award of attorney fees under this section is proper "if the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the
party is attempting to recover." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143
Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007) (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont
De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990)).
BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844,
851 (2008) (emphasis added); See also Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,
32, 105 p .3d 676, 692 (2005).
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In this case, all claims were based on a purchase agreement between Plaintiff and
CBI for an ongoing business. The Court finds that attorney fees are awardable under §
12-120(3).
The Court has reviewed the record and Plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs.
The Court has further considered the factors set out in Rule 54(e)(3), I.R.C.P., including
but not limited to the time required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, prevailing rates
for attorney fees, the amount in dispute, and duplication of effort. When considering
those factors, the Court finds that the claim for attorney fees should be discounted
somewhat.
Additionally, it is the Court's opinion that the amount of attorney fees should be
tempered inasmuch as Plaintiff should not recover attorney fees incurred in prosecuting
the claim against the Estate, since the Court dismissed that claim. Furthermore, it
appears to the Court there was at least some overlap between attorney fees incurred in
this action and fees incurred in the separate probate proceedings. Finally, certain
discovery and other matters pursued by Plaintiff did not materially contribute to Plaintiff
prevailing in this matter.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to
an award of attorney fees in the amount of $85,000.
CONCLUSION

Based on the record and the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs motion for costs and
fees is granted. As against Kenneth Rammell and CBI, Plaintiff is awarded $2,409.29 in
costs and $85,000 in attorney fees.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this J1_ day of June, 2012.

DISTRICT JUDGE

v

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ji

I hereby certify that on this
day of June, 2012, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox.
Jeffrey D. Brunson
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
David E. Alexander
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

~
By
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICI{\~ Dt~{I)JCT ., .,
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BeiNNEvlt£E.)9
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Case No. CV-09-2767
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.

AMENDED JUDGMENT

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendants/Counterclaimant.

The jury having entered a verdict in this matter, and the Court having entered its
order on Defendants' motion for jnov or new trial, and Plaintiff have accepted the Court's
remittitur, and the Court having entered its order on Plaintiffs motion for costs and
attorney fees, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall have judgment
against Defendants Kenneth Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., joint and several, in
the amount of $354,000. Plaintiff shall also have judgment against Defendant Christa
Beguesse, Inc., in the additional amount of $99,900 for a total of $453,900. Plaintiff
shall also have judgment against Defendants Kenneth Ran1mell and Christa Beguesse,
Inc., for costs in the amount of $2,409.29, and attorney fees in the amount of $85,000.
Resulting in a totaljudgment of$ 541,309.29 as to ChristaBeguesse, Inc., and
$441,409.29 as to Kenneth Rammell, with interest accruing thereon at the statutory rate.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's claim against the
Estate of Christa Beguesse is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

ICJ day of June, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

q

I hereby certify that on this } day of June, 2012, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upo~ parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox.
Jeffrey D. Brunson
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
David E. Alexander
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

~
By
Deputy Clerk

505
AMENDEDJUDGMENT-2

W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-13 91
Telephone: (208)232-61 01
Fax: (208)232-6109
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation,)

Case No. CV-09-2767

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa ,
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

TO:

)

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., AND ITS
ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that:
1.

The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent to the

Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on Jury Verdict in the above-entitled action on the
17th day of April, 2012, and the Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 12th day of June,
2012, the Honorable Joel B. Tingey presiding, and subsequent supplemental Orders and Judgments.
2.

The Appellants, Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., have a right of
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appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal.
a.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on all claims against Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc.;

b.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant new trial on all claims against
Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., and the counterclaim of Christa
Beguesse, Inc., against Plaintiff-Respondent;

c.

Whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were in error or contrary to law;

d.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant directed verdict as to Count 3 of the
Complaint, and all claims for fraud against the Defendants;

e.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rick Trulson;

f.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting Plaintiffs Exhibit 27a and examination of
the Defendant thereon;

g.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury on Plaintiffs
claims;

h.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question
1 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute oflimitations;

1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question
6 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute oflimitations;
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J.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question
9 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations;

k.

Whether the Court erred in admitting the testimony of April Beguesse in violation
ofldaho Code§ 9-202;

1.

Whether the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a) Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's transcript. The appellant requests

the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in [X] hard copy []electronic
fonnat [ ] both (check one): The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25, I.A.R.
supplemented by the following: Voir dire examination of jury, closing arguments of counsel,
conferences on requested instructions, arguments on motion for directed verdict.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's)
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All requested and given
jury instructions;

Appellants' motion for directed verdict and briefs submitted therewith;

Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial,
and briefs and exhibits submitted therewith.
7.

The appellant requests the following documents, chmis, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,
2, 7, 9, 14, 27a, and 45; Defendants' Exhibits A and B.
5.

I certifY:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

That the reporter of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
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preparation of the transcript;
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

(d)

That the Appellate filing fee has been paid;

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012.
RACINE OLSON NYE
\ BUDGE& BAILEY
/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (j_/iy of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

[~U.S. Mail
[
[
[

Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
P laintif£/Counterdefendant!Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
and,
THE ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal
representative, Kenneth Rammel!,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

Appeal from:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-2767
Docket No.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County

Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
Case number from Court:

CV-2009-2767

Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment Upon Verdict, entered April 18, 20 12; Supplemental Order
on Motion for New Trial; Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, entered June 12, 2012; Order on
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, entered June 19, 2012; and Amended Judgment, entered June 19,
2012
Attorney for Appellant:

David Alexander, RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE BAILEY
PO Box 1391, Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

Attorney for Respondent:

Jeffrey Brunson, BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

Appealed by:

Kenneth Rammell and Christa Beguess, Inc.

Appealed against:

April Beguess, Inc.

Notice of Appeal Filed:

July 20, 2012
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Appellate Fee Paid:

Yes

Was Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes

If so, name of reporter:

Jack Fuller, no estimate in file

Dated: July 30, 2012
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By:
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-61 01
Fax: (208)232-61 09
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , )
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
)
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its )
qualified personal representative, Kenneth )
Rammel!.
)
)
Defendants.
)

TO:

Case No. CV -09-2767

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., AND ITS
ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that:
1.

The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent to the

Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on Jury Verdict in the above-entitled action on the
17th day of April, 2012, and the Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 12th day of June,

2012, the Honorable Joel B. Tingey presiding, and subsequent supplemental Orders and Judgments.
2.

The Appellants, Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., have a right of

NOTICE OF APPEAL -1

513

appeal to the Idaho Supreme

urt, and the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are

appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to

asseti in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal.
a.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on all claims against Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc.;

b.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant new trial on all claims against
Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., and the counterclaim of Christa
Beguesse, Inc., against Plaintiff-Respondent;

c.

Whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were in error or contrary to law;

d.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant directed verdict as to Count 3 of the
Complaint, and all claims for fraud against the Defendants;

e.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rick Trulson;

f.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting Plaintiff's Exhibit 27 a and examination of
the Defendant thereon;

g.

\Vhether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury on Plaintiff's
claims;

h.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question
1 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations;

1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question
6 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

514

J.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question
9 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations;

k.

Whether the Court erred in admitting the testimony of April Beguesse in violation
of Idaho Code § 9-202;

1.

Whether the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a) Appellant requests thepreparationofareporter's transcript. The appellant requests

the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in [X] hard copy []electronic
format [ ] both (check one): The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25, I.A.R.
supplemented by the following: Voir dire examination of jury, closing arguments of counsel,
conferences on requested instructions, arguments on motion for directed verdict.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's)
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All requested and given
jury instructions;

Appellants' motion for directed verdict and briefs submitted therewith;

Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial,
and briefs and exhibits submitted therewith.
7.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Plaintiffs Exhibits 1,
2, 7, 9, 14, 27a, and 45; Defendants' Exhibits A and B.
8.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter, Jack

Fuller;
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(b)

That the repor1er of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the transcript;
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

(d)

That the Appellate filing fee has been paid;

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2012.
RACINE OLSON NYE
BUDGE&
E
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

""'<;.I-I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _H
day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

[XU. S.Mail
Postage Prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile

Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capitol Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

~
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[
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U.S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
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Jack L . Fuller , CSR
Offic ial Cou rt Repor t er
Seventh Judicial District
Bonnevill e Cou nty Cour thouse
605 N Capital Ave
Idaho Fa l ls , Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext. 1138
E-Mail: jfuller@co . bonneville .i d . us
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DATE:
TO:
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Stephen W. Kenyon , Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court I Court of Appeals
P . O. Box 83720
Boi se, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO :
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:
CAPTION OF CASE:

40212
CV-09-2767

April Beguesse ,

(Bonneville County)

Inc . vs . Kenneth

Rammell , et al
You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate
transcript in the above - entitled and numbered case has
been lodged with the District Court Cl e rk of the County
of Bonneville i n the Seventh Judicial District .
Sa i d
transcript consists of the following:
1.

Jury Trial

(April 10 - 13,

2012)

Respec tfully ,

--~~-~--~--------JACA . FULLER
Idaho CSR . #76 2

cc:

District Court Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
and,
THE ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal
representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-2767
Docket No. 40212

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District Court ofthe Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination:
please see attached sheets:

Exhibit List- April I 0, 2012
I.
Exhibit 7: Letter to The Rutter Group from Chrita Buguesse, dated January 7, 20 II
2.
Exhibit 9: Letter to The Rutter Group from Christ Beguesse, dated December 22, 2003
3.
Exhibit 14: ABI Codes
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Exhibit 2: Lease Agreement effective January 1, 2004
Exhibit B: 2004 Cash Flow Statement for April Beguesse
Exhibit A: List of Publications by The Rutter Group
Exhibit 1: ABI Payment Ledger
Exhibit 45: S. Martin handwritten notes
Exhibit 27a: Christa Burgesse 2000 K-1 tax schedule

And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this 28 1h day of December, 2012.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
and,
THE ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal
representative, Kenneth Rammel],
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO
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Case No. CV-2009-2767
Docket No. 40212

AMENDED CLERK'S
CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District Court of the Seventh Judicial District ofthe State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination:
please see attached sheets:

Exhibit
1.
2.
3.

List April I 0, 2012
Exhibit 7: Letter to The Rutter Group from Chrita Buguesse, dated January 7, 2011
Exhibit 9: Letter to The Rutter Group from Christ Beguesse, dated December 22, 2003
Exhibit 14: ABI Codes
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Exhibit 2: Lease Agreement effective January 1, 2004
Exhibit B: 2004 Cash Flow Statement for April Beguesse
Exhibit A: List of Publications by The Rutter Group
Exhibit 1: ABI Payment Ledger
Exhibit 45: S. Martin handwritten notes
Exhibit 27a: Christa Burgesse 2000 K-1 tax schedule

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the record:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Transcript: Deposition of Kenneth Rammell, Volume I, taken December 17, 2009
Transcript: Deposition of Kenneth Rammell, Volume II, taken December 18, 2009
Transcript: Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick, taken June 30, 2009
(The transcript of the Deposition of Linda Raznick was not located in the file; a copy was
obtained from Jeffrey Brunson)
Transcript: CV-09-1682 Probate Hearing, held August 4, 2011

And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this 1st day ofMay, 2013.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
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I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 ofthe Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certifY that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and
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the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this
28 111 day ofDecember, 2012.
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